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I. INTRODUCTION
Homer's heroes of the Illiad, and the Odyssey,2 Achilles and Odysseus, rage with murderous passions to certain provocations. In the
literary world, their actions make for epical stories, as their heroism
has been sung for centuries, by the Muse. But when such stories are
set in a legal world where heroes become defendants, these "heat of
passion7 cases fall between murder and manslaughter, and doubt remains about the verdict. In the case of Achilles, his wrath is with
King Agamemnon, for taking his spoil of war, the concubine Briseis;3
in the case of Odysseus, his anger is with the suitors, who woo his wife
while eating him out of house and home.4 When these heroes predictably erupt, the goddess of wisdom reacts with unpredictable contrariness: in the volatile Achilles case, Athena swoops down from Olympus
and stays his hand,5 whereas, for the more labile Odysseus, she goads
him to "clean house," by reaping murder and mayhem.6
Whether the gods are crazy, or whether Homer's "criminal law" is
tragically flawed or just primitive in development, are matters quite
beyond the scope of this Article. In this Article, I set the sights
lower-on the law-where expectations are, if anything, more Olympian. Unlike the literary realm where we eagerly suspend disbelief
and grant licence to heroes, gods, and authors for a good story, in the
law we expect Justice to be evenhanded and principled, guided by rule
rather than whim.
Law and literature may have a misunderstood relation,7 but the
latter will be used in Part II to foreshadow the complexities and contradictions that have plagued the murder vs. manslaughter distinction for centuries. The "cases" of Achilles fuming, Odysseus stewing,
and Hamlet brooding are our literary exemplars and defendants. But
in adjudicating their cases, troubling legal questions arise which are
not solely legal questions, I submit. My central thesis is that "man1. HoHmi, THE
2.
3.
4.
5.

6.

7.

IL an

(Alston H. Chase, et. al, eds., Little Brown and Company

1950).
HormE, THE ODYssEY (E.U. Rieu ed., Penguin Classics 1946).
HomER, supra note 1, Book I.
HoimR, supra note 2, Books XIII-XXIV.
HomER, supra note 1, at 38. "While he was debating this in heart and mind and
was drawing from the sheath his mighty sword, Athena came from heaven....
She stood behind the son of Peleus and grasped his yellow hair, appearing to him
alone... 'to check your fury.'" Id.
Ho =R, supra note 2, at 342. After the revenge has been completed, Penelope
recognizes, but only the half of it, that "it must be one of the immortal gods that
has killed the young lords, provoked, no doubt, by their galling insolence and
wicked ways."
RicHmw A. PosNm, LAw AND LrrERATuRE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION (1988).
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slaughter" is fundamentally a psychological theory of human nature.
This psychological theory involves a complex story of how provocations
(their type and intensity) relate to emotions (the heat of passion, and
the type of passions); how these provocations and emotions affect
thinking, intention, and reason; and how provocations, emotions, and
reason relate to our capacity to control the actions they seem to impel,
and if we even make choices, as we normally understand that term,
under such conditions.
Yet even this thesis is oversimplified. Manslaughter is also a theory of how time, situational context, and the history of the actor relate
to whether the blood cools or the emotions roil. Do provocations and
the passions they promote occur once, and then fade in time, as the
linear law of "time's arrow"8 would seem to have it? Or do events cycle
in our mind, 9 such that the one unrepeatable moment of the act is
brought back again? When "time" moves from the fixed, objective, and
external into the subjective mind, relative views of cause and effect, 10
and culpability, become possible, as in the poet's constructionll of
"time past" becoming "time present," such that yesterday's provocations and passions are here today, afresh. These possibilities suggest
radically different ways of construing time, provocation, passion,
memory, motive, action-and hence manslaughter.
The law has evolved its own complex psychological theory, which
becomes a moral and legal theory of whether acts that arise under
such circumstances should be punished fully, as in murder, or excused,' 2 or mitigated, as in manslaughter. Yet, the murder/man8. STEPHEN J. GouLD, TnM's ARRow, Tnm's CYcr: MYrH AND METAPHOR iN THE
DISCOVERY OF GEOLOGICAL TuME (1987).
9. Id.
10. ALAN IaGHTmAN, EmisTRxN's DREAMs: A NOVEL (1993).
11. GROVER SmiTH, T.S. ELIoT's POETRY AND PLAYs (1950)(while 'time" is a central
theme in many of Eliots works, Burnt Norton is the source of these phrases).
12. See HOMER, supra note 2, at 363. While the law does not typically contemplate
manslaughter as an excusing condition, we see that Zeus and Athena let Odysseus off the hook completely at the end of the Odyssey. As Zeus says to Athena:
"'My child, why come to me with such questions? Was it not your own idea that
Odysseus should return and avenge himself on his enemies? Act as you please,

though this is what I think most suitable myself. Since the admirable Odysseus
has had his revenge on the Suitors, let them make a treaty of peace to establish
him as king in perpetuity, with an act of oblivion, on our part, for the slaughter of
their sons and brothers. Let the mutual goodwill of the old days be restored, and
let peace and plenty prevail.'" Id.
Though the statuesque imagery of Justice being blind remains courtly and
current, modem law seldom dispenses "an act of oblivion, on our part." Since we
do "see," to limited degree, the extreme response of excusing is not the likely outcome in a less Olympian court. Thus, today's Odysseus is likely "doing time."

But even the ancient Odysseus might have been punished had the jury been citizens rather than gods, for the concept of a disrupted harmony needing to be reestablished was deeply embedded in the classical world, and Odysseus surely
disrupted that harmony. And had he been tried in Aristotle's time, in that high
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slaughter distinction, despite centuries of common law cases and
legislative statutes, remains indistinct and problematic, I submit.
The root cause of the law's problem is its underlying "psychological
theory" of manslaughter-where "provocations," "emotions," "thinking," "control," "time," and "context" interplay-but do not play well.
In Part I, we see how this "theory" grew over time, as one objective rule after another was added to the theoretical mix, and where
inconsistencies among the rules were muted or ignored. As a result,
there grew a Hydra-like theory that was not just complex, but contradictory: like its mythological cousins the Chimera and the Gorgons,13
this Hydra featured disparate parts and only one eye to see the whole.
Yet, when the "objective law" began to recognize contradictions in its
theory and variability in case law outcomes, it tried to stave off the
subjective, psychological, and inevitable-by trotting out the "ordinary man" exemplar. Instead of Perseus, who might have slain the
beast and started anew, the "ordinary man" turned out to be a conjurer, for he would spare the beast by making the problems of subjectivity, human variability, and even the defendant disappear from the
courtroom. The law, thus reduced to formal objective rules and a caricature-had lost touch with the psychological human drama that it
was supposed to address.
The law had a complex theory that lacked internal consistency,
and a theory that promoted objectivity, but could not eliminate subjectivity. Pursuing the theme of objectivity vs. subjectivity, we turn in
Part IV to the discipline of Psychology, which has studied matters relating to provocations, emotions, thinking, control, and actions. This
selective review brings some empiricalfindings and conceptual understandings to the table, and advances another thesis: that the "objective law" grew far more from speculative notions than from empirical
substance. As a result, we find the Law's psychological theory to be
out of tune with Psychology's psychological theory. But we also find,
in this brief review, academic psychology facing its own "objective vs.
subjective" debate, and the direction it seems to be taking.
In Parts V and VI, continuing with the theme of objectivity vs. subjectivity, we move to the heart of this Article-commonsense psychology. The thesis here is that not only is the Law's theory of
manslaughter at odds with itself, and at odds with academic Psychology's theory-but that the Hydra-headed beast does not fit with jurors' commonsense psychology. In these Parts, two bench mark cases
are systematically varied in two different experiments in order to determine what relevant factors determine verdicts (murder vs. manslaughter), and what reasons (objective vs. subjective) mock jurors
court known as the Araeopagus for murder, appeals to emotion and psychologically mitigating factors would have counted for very little.
13. THomAs BuIINcH, BULFimci's MYTHOLOGY 120, 127 (1979).
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give for their verdicts. The results are clear and consistent-but they
do not accord with the objective rules of manslaughter. Far from using objective rules or simple heuristics, ordinary citizens use a complex calculus in determining culpability, a calculus weighted in the
subjective, psychological direction, but one that does not lose objectivity entirely.
In Part VII, with the Law clearly turning from objectivity toward
subjectivity in the Model Penal Code ("MPC"),14 this new "subjective"

turn is scrutinized. The MPC's "extreme mental or emotional disturbance" (EED) standard-in some ways more subjective and disconnected from the psychological matrix than academic or commonsense
psychology, produces confusion in case law and incoherence in theory.
The law's new "subjectivity," while clearly bending if not bowing toward psychology, still fails to accord with the evidence from academic
and commonsense psychology. More importantly, for the law, is that
this new subjectivity may be out of tune with some of the law's most
enduring precepts.
In Part VIII, some conclusions are put forth. It may be, as Professor Richard Singer has concluded, that less law turns out to be more
law.15 An even better bet is that more empirical, commonsense psychology will produce better law, for it will ground the law in something
firmer, though that soil will necessarily have a distinctly psychological
and subjective pH. This is neither the default option nor the lesser
offense option, but a renovating virtue, I submit. For when the law
either loses touch with the psychological human drama, gets it wrong,
or relegates the subjective to the sidelines-and replaces it with formal rules and cardboard caricatures-jurors will nullify or reconstrue.
In such a legal world, the modern courtroom dramas of today's Achilles, Odysseus, and Hamlet become humanless affairs, yielding a law
not worthy of commonsense respect. If Homer or Shakespeare had
erred in that direction, this story would be over now.

CODE § 210.3(1)(b)(Proposed Official Draft 1962).
15. Richard Singer, The Resurgence of Mens Rea: I-Provocation,Emotional Disturbance, and the Model Penal Code, 27 B.C. L. REv. 243, 322 (1986). Singer writes:
Almost a century ago, the Kentucky Supreme Court urged that lower
courts should not try to define the term "adequate provocation," but
should simply leave the term to the jury without further guidelines. A
similar solution to the manslaughter issue now would eradicate the interminable difficulties which four centuries of inconsistency, inaccuracy,
and formalism have generated. This approach may seem simplistic. But
after four centuries of recognizing that some distinction must be made
among killers, while struggling with a verbal formula to capture that
distinction, it may, perhaps, be true that here, as in many other areas,
less really is more.
14. MODEL PENAL
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II. THREE LITERARY EXEMPLARS
To use the literary, we must first take a few liberties with Homer.
First, we must imagine what would have happened had Athena not
stayed Achilles' hand. We need not wonder long, for Homer's portrayal lets us know that the death of King Agamemnon would surely
have followed. The next liberty is to imagine both Achilles and Odysseus as heroes-turned-defendants, now facing murder charges in a
modern court, where both claim that it was not murder, but
manslaughter.
If we play out the manslaughter claims of Achilles and Odysseus,
staying faithful to Homer's facts, Achilles would appear to have the
stronger claim. He killed "upon a sudden," in the "heat of passion,"
with red-hot emotions rising so fast that reason seemed unable to restrain them; after all, the goddess had to fly down and yank him by
the hair, as he seemed quite beyond the point of bringing himself up
short. Then there is the intent factor: while Achilles held Agamemnon in contempt,1 6 there is no textual evidence that Achilles planned
or premeditated his killing. This lack of intent would seem to doom
the "murder story" that the prosecution must present and prove.
From these facts, the defense's manslaughter claim looks likely to fly.
But if Achilles' case has an Achilles heel (and it may have several),
it would concern provocation. Was King Agamemnon's taking of
Achilles' spoil of war "adequate provocation" to ignite a murderous
act? The law might think not. It certainly was neither an "assault"
nor a "battery," as we ordinarily understand those terms. Moreover,
the text makes it clear that this provocation had a "history" to it, and
that Achilles had a significant part in bringing it about: we learn that
Agamemnon was pressured by his fellow Greeks to give up his concubine, Chyrseis, to appease Apollo, and that Achilles led that effort.
Viewed in this context, Agamemnon's act looks more like tit for tat,
coupled, perhaps, with the customary and accepted practice of kingly
prerogative. What we do not see are sticks and stones or swords and
spears-for the only thing Agamemnon hurls are words.
A second weakness to Achilles' manslaughter claim is that while
the act appeared "upon a sudden," it was not without thought. As Homer writes, "and anger arose in Peleus' son. His heart within his
shaggy breast pondered two courses-whether, drawing his sharp
sword from his thigh, he should disperse the others and slay the son of
Atreus, or should quell his wrath and curb his spirit."'17 If Achilles

can conduct such an internal debate, pondering two very different
courses, then there is prima facie evidence that reason, control, and
16. HomR, supra note 1, at 7. Achilles calls Agamemnon "[gireedy one, clothed in
shamelessness" and "dog-face."
17. Id. at 8.
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choice are operating. To choose the death course invites an attribution of malice aforethought; to choose at all invites the attribution that
there is a chooser exercising control, and not simply emotions heating
past the boiling point. If we ask the mythical, "objective reasonable
person" to decide the case, Achilles' claim, which was flying high a
moment ago, might now crash and burn. But if we ask jurors to decide
the case-jurors who might not follow objective standards-the verdict is in doubt.
By contrast to the red-hot Achilles, Odysseus looks more the coldblooded killer. At the level of thinking, he plans and premeditates. At
the level of emotion, his anger does not appear "of a sudden or in
"heat of passion," but is seemingly controlled and in the service of his
intent. And his intent is to efficiently massacre all the suitors.
When we move from his intent and his emotions back to the provocation, there are further problems. The fact that the suitors courted
his wife Penelope, while he was missing for the last ten years, is not a
crime. After all, Penelope's parents were urging her to remarry, believing their daughter to be a widow; furthermore, she herself was
skillfully manipulating the suitors: in short, she was neither the innocent nor the put-upon victim, but an active player in the courting
game. As for the provocation of being eaten out of house and home,
that "crime" is also no crime; it may reflect bad manners, but that is
not a killing offense.
If Odysseus' manslaughter claim does not fall on grounds of intent
(which he has), or emotion (which he lacks), or provocation (which
seems inadequate), it is likely to fall because of time. He had ample
time between the provocations and the killing deed for the hot blood to
cool. In Odysseus' defense, he might claim that the slights were not
single but cumulative episodes: in this view, individual provocations
which would not reach manslaughter's threshold, well might reach if
provocations build; extending that notion, one might then argue that
the blood never cooled, for each additional provocation inflames anew.
But such a cumulative view of provocations shifts the focus from the
objective to the subjective, a perspectival shift that the law would be
unwilling to make for centuries. Thus, from an objective perspective
on cooling time and provocation, Odysseus' claims appear to come up
short. Yet, if the matter was set before jurors, they might find that
subjective perspective compelling, despite what the law says. Though
his claim may be substantially weaker than Achilles' on objective
dimensions, its failure before a jury is not guaranteed.
The third manslaughter claimant is literature's consummate
brooder, Hamlet, a man who, for all his "to be or not to be" talk, cannot
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do the deed he was commanded to do.18 His father's ghost sets him to
"[r]evenge his foul and most unnatural murther."' 9 Hamlet asks for
the name of the murderer so "that I, with wings as swift ...

may

sweep to my revenge."20 The name is given, the storyline is set, and
then the audience waits... and waits, as Hamlet's wings never get off
the ground. Rather, he broods. As he does so, time passes, the provocation recedes, and the blood cools. As a result, his eventual manslaughter claim will fail one objective rule after another. These rules,
as we shall soon see, are not kind to brooders, nor to the brooder's kin,
the "rekindler."
In a rekindling case, someone has suffered the type of provocation
that would warrant manslaughter, had the person killed on the spot;
however, the rekindler kills some time later, when a small provocation
occurs which would not warrant manslaughter, but which does ignite
the rekindler to kill. Hamlet the brooder may have been Hamlet the
rekindler, at the end.
In the last act, Hamlet and Laertes are both wounded with the
poisoned rapier, only Hamlet does not know he is a dead man. 2 1 The
Queen falls and dies, her last words being "the drink! I am
poison'd."22 Now Hamlet gets more words, this time from the dying
Laertes, who reveals: "Hamlet, thou art slain .... The treacherous
instrument is in thy hand, unbated and envenom'd .... Thy mother's
poison'd ....

[T]he King's to blame."23 On the basis of these "mere

words," the truth of which is uncertain, Hamlet strikes: "Then,
venom, to thy work."2 4 While this act appears "of a sudden," arising
from "heat of passion," the provocation at the moment of the act is the
words of a third party. The King simply sits on his throne, presenting
no visible danger. Still, if we take Laertes' dying declaration as the
truth, as Hamlet surely did, then informational words, if subjectively
construed, may be the equivalent of a dagger to the heart, and enough
for a jury to find for manslaughter. On the other hand, when viewed
more objectively, they are only words that may fail to reach the level of
adequate provocation.
Here is where rekindling comes into play. These words may trigger the old words of his father's Ghost, igniting a heat of passion much
greater than Laertes' words alone. Yet a law that restricts our analysis to the moment of the act may eliminate Act I's flame from Act V's
passion, and prevent old provocations from inflaming with the new.
18. WImIi SHAKEsPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF HA=ILT, PRINCE OF DENMAIK

Kittridge, ed., 1939).
19. Id. at act 1, sc. 5.
20. Id.
21. Id. at act 5, sc. 2.

22. Id.
23. Id.

24. Id.

(George L.
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In Hamlet's final scene, Shakespeare leaves us with an ambiguous
stage direction which might doom Hamlet's manslaughter claim-if
understood in this uncommon way. What if Hamlet's rapier thrust
only wounded the King, and was not the death blow? The staging direction, following "venom, to thy work" says, "[Hurts the King]," 25 and
the King says, "I am but hurt."26 Although almost all productions of
Hamlet see the rapier thrust as the death blow, and thus the King and
Hamlet are dead men waiting to happen, the non-lethal interpretation
leads to a different possibility ... and verdict. Now, when Hamlet

forces the King to "drink off this potion,"27 it is the drink that kills.
This act and the inferred intention look like a deliberate act of murder. To a jury "that are but mutes or audience to this act,"28 they may
see "revenge-the deed he was given to do-but for which the law,
unlike the theatre, does not sanction. Focusing on the drink rather
than the thrust, the jurors may find malice aforethought, and murder
rather than manslaughter.
The murder/manslaughter distinction remains indistinct. At this
point, verdict outcomes for these three literary exemplars must be
placed on hold, for the actions of these heroes, and of the ghosts and
gods that dally above and about, leave too many nuances in the air,
and too many questions in doubt. In search of answers, we turn back
from the literary to the law-where objective rules and a psychological theory of manslaughter were evolving.
III. ON THE OBJECTIVE RULES OF MANSLAUGHTER
Lord Coke, who authored one of the first murder vs. manslaughter
distinctions, held that in manslaughter, both the act and the intent
are distinguishable from murder.29 The objective act, says Coke, occurs "upon a sudden," from chance medley situations, while the actor's
subjective intent, unlike murder, does not involve malice aforethought.30 In Coke's view, act and intent become definitionally fused,
for the nature of the act fixes the intent: in a chance medley killing,
there is "no time for the defendant to establish hatred or ill will toward the deceased,"31 and thus "a killing done upon chance medley is
by definition not done with malice."32 If we view Hamlet's rapier
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

29. Sm EDWARD Com, INsTrrUTEs (1628).

30. Id. at 55.
31. Singer, supra note 15, at 252.

32. Id. at 251.

1995]

MURDER/MANSLAUGHTER DISTINCTION

751

thrust at the King in Act V, Scene ii as a chance medley situation,
then Hamlet's crime could not be murder by Coke's analysis.33
But something is rotten here. First, Coke assumes that malice
cannot arise when deadly action occurs suddenly. But this is an empirical question, and not a tautological truism. Coke's assumption can
be overturned by the likes of Achilles, who, with wrath on the rise,
nonetheless contemplates which of two courses to take. Perhaps there
are many people who, despite fast-rising emotions, still form an intent
to kill in that brief interval between provocation and action.
A second objection concerns "upon a sudden"-a phrase that suggests that these acts arise ex nihilo, or out of chaos, or from spontaneous medley combustion. However, on closer examination, some of
these acts may be long on history and rich in context. For example,
when Achilles reaches for his sword and Hamlet thrusts the rapier,
these "sudden" acts arise in a context where the defendants knew the
victims, had previous interactions with them, and no doubt had feelings about the victim long before the deadly action took place. Neither
Achilles nor Hamlet starts with an emotional blank slate before the
"upon a sudden" act; if that be the case, then new provocations can
reopen old wounds, producing much greater passion than the current
provocation would suggest. But more important than excess passion
is the possibility that the non-blank slate contains murderous
thoughts as well. Lord Coke, who may have been in the audience of
the original production of Shakespeare's Hamlet, does not seem to allow for the possibility that Hamlet had his murderous thoughts at the
ready, and was just waiting to do the premeditated deed when he
seized upon the apparent chance-medley moment; this would be an
instance where a murderer, with malice aforethought, uses the appearance of "upon a sudden" to literally get away with murder.
Coke's distinction was inchoate, a rudimentary beginning that left
much out. He did not use the phrase most identified with manslaughter, "heat of passion," and he failed to explore the notion of "provocation," and what provocations would be adequate. The objective rules
of manslaughter that evolved over the next three centuries would fill
in what Coke left blank. While those rules would be abstracted from
common law cases, they would owe their firmness more to the treatise
writers than the cases. As Professor Singer claims, even when case
law revealed numerous contradictions and exceptions, the treatise
33. This analysis may be simplistic. For example, if Hamlet had malice prepense,
and then learns that the King has poisoned the wine, this fact may be just the
excuse he was looking for to now stage his "preemptive strike" against someone
clearly out to kill him. In this analysis, murder might be the appropriate verdict.
Yet such an analysis takes us beyond the psychological state of the actor, for we
must now consider the real intent, or plausibly assumed intent, of the victim.

752
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writers argued that these rules were clear, thereby "articulating the
3
law as they thought it should be, not as it was." 4

A. Mere Words vs. Informational Words
In the law of what "should be," one objective rule that has been
firmly in place for centuries is that "mere words" (including insults,
t;aunts, and wry faces) are insufficient as a provocation: As the adage
goes, while sticks and stones will warrant manslaughter, names will
not. Yet cracks in the wall separating words from deeds soon developed, with an early exception involving "informational words." In
John Royley's Case,3 5 a father is informed by his son that the victim
beat the son. The father does not see the beating, but only hears the
telling. According to Singer, "[t]he father then ran three-quarters of a
mile, found the man who beat his son, and killed him. The court, upon
a special verdict of the jury, was unanimously of the opinion that 'it
was but manslaughter,' because the killing was 'upon that sudden
occasion.' "36
The Royley Case is even more troubling, because Singer's summary 37 omits some key facts-facts that worsen Royley's manslaugh-

ter case. The actual case summary states that "[a] man's son having
been beat by another boy, the father goes a mile to find him, and there,
in revenge of his son's quarrel, strikes the boy with a little cudgel
... ."38 So it is a boy, not a man, or even a young man. Moreover, the
"beating" that was administered to the young William Royley by the
other boy, John Derman, was described this way: "the said John
Derman beating him so as his nose bled, he thereupon went to his
father, telling and complaining to him of that battery. .

.

."39 These

new facts change the nature of the provocation, and change the picture of defendant Royley's response. In the new picture, Royley intervenes in a fight between two boys, where the injury to his son was a
nose bleed; second, he intervenes with a cudgel, a weapon disproportionate to the original provocation; and third, there is still the matter
of the time interval.
The Royley court broke new and troubling ground, even as the
court seemed to deny so by singing the old "upon a sudden" refrain.
Still, even if we begin our analysis at the sudden and deadly end,
there is no "of a sudden." Royley ran three-quarters of a mile before
killing the victim, and even if he was a world-class miler, four minutes
or more have got to pass after he hears the provocation and before he
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Singer, supra note 15, at 258 (footnote omitted).
Cro. Jac. 296, 79 Eng. Rep. 254 (England 1666).
Singer, supra note 15, at 255 (footnote omitted).
Id.
John Royley's Case, Cro. Jac. 296, 296, 79 Eng. Rep. 254, 254 (England 1666).
Id. at 296, 79 Eng. Rep. at 254.
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kills. In Lord Coke's terms, this is not a chance medley act where
swiftness prevents malice aforethought from forming or the blood
from cooling. Royley has at least four minutes, probably ten, amidst
the huffing and puffing, to either cool the blood or form the malice.
If our analysis moves to the front end provocation, there is another
problem for the strictly objective approach. Since Royley did not see
but only heard of the beating, it is possible that his son embellished,
exaggerated, or even falsified the tale; perhaps the son said a "man
did this to me; thus, it is possible that Royley's "information" was misinformation or disinformation-objectively false-though Royley subjectively believed it to be true. If the "metaphysical truth" does not
matter, but only what Royley believed, then this so-called "objective"
rule is nothing of the sort, for we now land in the subjective psyche of
Royley and every defendant in the dock who hears information.
Where the objective vs. subjective line blurred in Royley, the court
seemed to handle the dilemma and restore clarity by invoking a version of the objective reasonable man test: if the reasonable man would
likely believe the son, then the provocation was so. Put another way,
if the subjective view is endorsed by enough reasonable people, then it
is objective enough, as the absolute truth of the provocation need not
trouble us. But if reasonable people divide, such that there is no consensus, then a consensus test will fail to extract us from the objective
vs. subjective morass. But Royley, who arrives on the scene, now has
his own eyes to aid him, and he sees that the assailant is a boy. Yet
this fact does not seem material in the court's ruling.
The subjective implications of Royley do not stop there. Once the
court sanctions aural as well as ocular provocations, it is acknowledging, wittingly or not, that informational words can be translated into
passion-evoking pictures, and that this sort of provocation can be just
as potent, powerful, and adequate as seeing the beating. But stimuli
do not translate; a person translates. While one man might get enraged, another might not. And even a man who is enraged might
cease to be enraged when he finds that the one who gave the nose
bleed turns out to be a boy. It is not so much the provocative stimulus,
be it words or sights, but the defendant's unique emotional make up
that determines the heat of the passion-and this is both subjective
and variable. But the Royley court would not move the law of provocations from objective reality into the psychological makeup of the defendant; such a subjective step was a long way off. Rather, Royley
remained the case that added a new "objective" rule, putting a few
erstwhile murderers into the manslaughter column, saved by a few
informational words.
What Royley grants-the reductive effect from murder to manslaughter on the basis of certain informational words-Justice Park,
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in Regina v. Fisher,40 tried to remove. In this 1837 case, a fifteenyear-old is sodomized by a man named Randall, and the next day, the
father of the boy, seeks out Randall and first beats him with a short
stick, then draws a table knife and stabs him to death. In Justice
Park's finding for murder, he cites 'the cooling' factor first, rather than
'the not seeing' factor, which makes this an insufficient provocation.
First, "[wihether the blood had time to cool or not, is rather a question
of law,"41 rather than a matter for the jury to decide; and the Justice

seemed to indicate that Fisher's day-late run indicated an intent to
"inflict vengeance on the offender."42 And second, in mentioning that
the father "only heard of what had been done from others," the seeing
factor remains relevant, leading Justice Park to conclude that "there
is not sufficient provocation to reduce this offence even to
manslaughter."43
If you do not distinguish Royley from Fisheron the basis of cooling
off time-where Royley took off immediately while Fisher waited until
the next day-then the cases are similar, though their verdicts contradict. Justice Park's assertion that hearing of the sodomy is inadequate provocation is inconsistent with the Royley Court's
determination that hearing of a beating was adequate. This "inadequate provocation" conclusion is likely to be inconsistent with what
citizens say as well.44 Moreover, Justice Parks ruling ignored the testimony of two witnesses, who stated "that the prisoner appeared to be
in a great passion."45 Thus, despite the more provocative facts and
the eyewitness testimony in this case, which suggest that Fisher had a
stronger manslaughter claim than Royley, Park's "murder" conclusion
seems out of tune with both the facts and the existing law. That it
was also out of tune with community sentiment can be inferred from
the jury's apparent nullification of Justice Park's instruction that
hearing of the sodomy was insufficient provocation; the jury brought
in a verdict of manslaughter and a recommendation of mercy.
B. Adultery
"Informational word" cases, once we ignore exceptions like Fisher,
reveal that "adequate provocations" need not be sticks and stones, or
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

8 Car. & P. 182, 173 Eng. Rep. 452 (England 1837).
Id. at 186, 173 Eng. Rep. at 454.
Id. at 186, 173 Eng. Rep. at 454.
Id. at 186, 173 Eng. Rep. at 454.
Though I have done no empirical investigation of this question, I have little doubt
about how the results would turn out if I asked 100 fathers this question: "Which
is worse, your son being sodomized by a man or your son getting a bloody nose
from another boy?"
45. Regina v. Fisher, 8 Car. & P. 182, 182, 173 Eng. Rep. 452, 452 (England 1837).
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assaults and batteries. The next new objective rule, a breach of a different sort, involved adultery. As Singer writes:
[n]o 'rule' of adequate provocation was more firmly entrenched, even by the
end of the eighteenth century, than that which proclaimed that a spouse (a

husband, of course) who found his wife in bed with a lover,4and
killed one or
both of them, was entitled to a reduction to manslaughter. 6

The caveats to the rule were that it had to be adultery, and that mere
suspicion of adultery was not sufficient.
Why adultery-of all the possible provocations that were not physical assaults or batteries-enjoyed this special exempt status from
murder is a matter beyond the scope of this Article. What is clear is
that the "rule" runs into contradiction, particularly alongside the informational words exception. Whereas the adultery rule demands ocular evidence-seeing the adultery with one's own eyes47-the
informational words rule allows an exception for aural evidence. Furthermore, the adultery rule eliminates "mere suspicion," whereas
Royley, in the informational words case, reacts to a suspicion of a
beating.
So what happens if the defendant does not see the adultery, but
only hears about it? In the 1848 North Carolina case of State v.
John,48 and the 1866 British case of Regina v. Smith,49 knowledge of
adultery of a non-ocular sort was at issue. In John, the "defendant
sought to introduce evidence that his wife and the victim had been
having an affair for some period of time. The court excluded the evidence on the grounds that the defendant had to find the two in bed:
Hale, Foster, East and Russell all agree in stating that, to extenuate the offense, the husband must find the deceased in the very act of adultery.... A
belief-nay a knowledge... that the deceased had been carrying on an adulterous intercourse with his wife, cannot change the character of the
homicide.50

Where Royley succeeds, John loses. Yet in terms of the aural vs.
ocular distinction, John is indistinguishable from Royley, for John
hears about the adultery as Royley hears about the beating. In
Royley, the ears were good enough, but not so, in John. If the beating
and the adultery are adequate provocations if seen, why does "hearing
of a beating" retain its potency as an "adequate provocation" while
"hearing of adultery" becomes "inadequate?" In creating a special mitigating category for adultery, but in limiting its band width to the visi46. Singer, supra note 15, at 256.
47. Under such a rule, a blind husband, hearing the sounds ofhis wife's adultery and

his cuckoldry, who then kills, may not get the manslaughter reduction that would
go to a visually intact husband who sees and kills. Thus, when love is literally

blind, there may be an added penalty.
48. 30 N.C. (8 Ired.) 330 (1848).
49. 4 Fost. & F. 1066, 176 Eng. Rep. 910 (England 1866).
50. Singer, supra note 15, at 273 (footnote omitted).
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ble spectrum, an inconsistency develops between some adultery and
informational word cases.
In Regina v. Smith,51 William Smith killed his wife after she "violently abused him, taunting him with her preference for Langley,"52 a
man with whom she had lived in adultery, but who was now dead.
Beyond taunting and using foul language, she may have "spat in her
husband's face," although in the next sentence the record indicates
3
that whether she "actually spat on, or only at him, did not appear."5
Though the Justices divided, the ruling in Smith, finding him guilty of
manslaughter, seemed to suggest that "words spoken" could aggravate
the provocation, as could being spat upon. The Smith court's ruling
either (a) overturns the "mere words" rule, (b) creates a new objective
rule, or (c) abandons the objective approach for the subjective. If the
court is now sanctioning "taunts" as "sufficient provocation," then it is
reversing one of the oldest rules which held that mere words, taunts,
names, and wry faces were not sufficient. More likely, the court was
carving out a new objective rule-categorizing certain kinds of
taunts-cuckolding taunts that strike at his manhood, plus spat,
whether the spittle lands or not-as amounting to assaults (and battery)-which would be sufficiently provocative. Looked at objectively,
this ruling merely expands the universe of what is "reasonable" provocation to the reasonable person, and thus it does no more than what
Royley's informational words did: it added a new category to the list of
sufficient provocations for the manslaughter reduction.
A less likely interpretation is that the Smith court was subjectivizing provocations. Where most forms of "assault" and all "batteries"
were understood to involve a physical touching, now, in a subjective
interpretation, the wife's taunts and spat are felt by Smith as literal
slaps. So much for "names will never harm me," once names reify in
either Smith's mind or the court's eye. But to the objectivist, figurative and literal are not equal save in someone's psyche, and that is not
a road the objectivist wants to travel. If law is to be grounded on terra
firma rather than the infirm psyche that varies from one individual to
the next, we must not subjectively distort external reality, or conflate
it with some internal reality.
Yet just this sort of subjectivity and conflation seems evident in
Maher v. People,54 where the defendant was charged with "an assault
with intent to kill and murder one Patrick Hunt."55 Had Maher killed
Hunt, this would have been a murder vs. manslaughter situation,
though the case was discussed in such terms. William Maher acted
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

4 Fost. & F. 1066, 1066, 176 Eng. Rep. 910, 910 (England 1866).
Id. at 1066, 176 Eng. Rep. at 910.
Id. at 1066, 176 Eng. Rep. at 910.
10 Mich. 212 (1862).
Id. at 215.

1995]

MURDER/MANSLAUGHTER DISTINCTION

757

under the belief that Hunt was having an adulterous relationship
with Maher's wife. Maher had two pieces of evidence: first, on the
morning of the assault, he saw his wife and Hunt going into the woods
together and coming out an hour later, just before he followed Hunt
into a saloon and fired; second, before entering the saloon, a friend
informed Maher that his wife had had sexual intercourse with Hunt
the day before in the woods.
The first piece of evidence was visual but short-sighted, as Maher
failed to see the act. The second piece is informational; someone else
caught the act, but the defendant only got a report. Given the adultery rule, mere information or inference does not add up to witnessing
the flagrante. That may be the law, yet Judge Christiancy speculated
on how a jury would have heard such evidence, and he believed that
they would have put two and two together and found "sufficient evidence of provocation."5 6 This seems to acknowledge that the formal
rules were out of tune with what "men of fair average mind and disposition"57 would construe.

Maher also makes an interesting subjective point. Judge Christiancy notes that provocation itself "must depend upon the nature of
man and the laws of the human nind."58 Illustrating this point, he
wrote:
The passion excited by a blow received in a sudden quarrel, though perhaps
equally violent for the moment, would be likely much sooner to subside than if
aroused by a rape committed upon a sister or a daughter, or the discovery of

an adulterous intercourse with wife; and no two cases of the latter kind would

be likely to be identical in all their circumstances of provocation. 59
In the evolution of manslaughter's objective rules, we find

problematic exceptions with each new objective rule. Moreover, we find that
new rules are often inconsistent with old rules, producing contradiction rather than consistency. And finally, there is the spectre of subjectivity, the press to take the defendant's point of view, which
declares "objectivity" to be the wrong approach. All of these problems
recur as we turn from heating, to the "cooling off" rule.
C.

Cooling Off

The "cooling off" rule is at least as old as Coke's original pronouncements. As Singer writes, "ifkilling in 'heat of passion' or 'upon
a sudden! is manslaughter, then, almost tautologically, killing in 'cool
blood,' and not suddenly, is not manslaughter."60 As old as the rule
was, it went unmentioned in Royley, where the father raced three56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at 225.
Id. at 220.
Id. at 222.
Id.
Singer, supra note 15, at 275.
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quarters of a mile to kill the boy who allegedly beat his son, thus having time, either during or after his sprint, for the blood to cool; rather,
the Royley court considered this an "upon a sudden" case. But in Regina v. Fisher,where the father sets out after the victim the morning
after the victim allegedly sodomized his son, the court finds that
Fisher's blood had time to cool. With the Royley and Fisher cases as
anchors, the mathematically inclined jurist finds the "objective bloodcooling time" to be longer than Royley's 10 minute sprint, but shorter
than Fisher's day-late run. However, when we add the 1886 case of
Pauline v. State6 ' to the mix, a case where the adultery rule and the
informational words rule are conveniently ignored, the cooling off time
not only dilates, but disappears entirely. The initial facts were these.
Lewis Pauline gets a letter on January 5th informing him that his
wife is having an adulterous relationship with the victim, whom he
kills on February 7th. The court held that too much time had passed
between the provocation and the murder, as a matter of law. Said
another way, the blood had long cooled, even as the Maher court acknowledged that some provocations, like adultery, might not cool
quickly for every cuckold. But on rehearing, the Pauline court learns
that the letter had actually been dated February 5th, not January 5th.
This new corrected fact made all the difference to the court, for it now
"establishes the killing on the first meeting after appellant had been
informed of the adultery of the appellant's wife with the deceased."62
Whether Pauline gets the letter on January 5 or February 5, or
even February 7, the words remain, for all time, merely informational
words; he has no ocular evidence. Having already dealt with the problematic nature of provocations, let us grant the court's dubious view
that this February 5 letter is sufficient provocation, and turn directly
to the implications for time.
Pauline kills two days later, which is one day later than Fisher,
who was already a day late. Pauline thus pushes the cooling-off time
back. More importantly, Pauline makes time moot: by the court's
logic, if Pauline killed 5 days later, or 50 days later, it would not matter, so long as this was Pauline's first meeting with the victim.
The psychology of Coke's rule about provocation, passion, and cooling-off time was simple: if an adequate provocation arouses murderous passions, those passions will cool with time. Yet, in Pauline,there
is no drop in the two day interval between receiving the provocative
letter and the lethal act; moreover, given the court's reading, there
would be no drop if the interval was 5 days or 50. This, in effect,
makes the rule about "cooling-off time" not about time at all.
61. 1 S.W. 453 (Tex. 1886).
62. Id. at 464.
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In a second interpretation of the court's psychology, rather than
staying red hot for two days without cooling, Pauline becomes a
"rekindler": here, his temperature drops with time, but flairs red hot
again with seeing the victim. This rekindling interpretation involves
a legally insufficient provocation (i.e., seeing the victim) evoking the
two-day-old sufficient (?) provocation (i.e., news of adultery). While
this hypothesis may be more plausible than the non-cooling one, validating the hypothesis requires a plunge into Pauline's subjectivity, a
course many courts were refusing to set. But in eschewing subjectivity for objectivity, the Pauline court runs aground, as the rule about
provocation collides with the rule about cooling-off time. The court
can say that non-ocular news of adultery is sufficient provocation, but
to hold that a killing two days later is still manslaughter, ignores
time, while holding heat constant. To squeeze out of the dilemma by
claiming that the cooling clock does not begin to run until the defendant sees the victim is absurd. What if Pauline first sees the victim two
years later?
Had the Pauline court openly taken the subjective route, it would
have meant granting the proposition that new and minor provocations
could re-ignite the old; this would make rules about time, "upon a sudden," and adequate provocation irrelevant. Whereas the objective
road leads to frequent collisions among rules, the subjective, rekindling road leads, perhaps, to incendiary, for no rule is left standing. It
may be that the Paulinecourt was granting an exception for the rekindler, albeit masking it in objective language of "sufficient" provocation,
once the illicit connection was discovered. But as Professor Gobert
recognized, this exception would "virtually abrogate the cooling-off period requirement." 63 And Singer, taking the court's conclusion to its
logical end, finds that "the doctrine seriously challenges every aspect
4
of the objectification of provocation."6
Where Pauline apparently grants the exemption to a rekindler,
State v. Gounagias65 does not. In State v. Gounagias, defendant:
a Greek immigrant, had purposely killed the deceased. He sought to introduce evidence that he had been sodomized by the deceased and that for the
next three weeks, the defendants friends, who had learned about the incident
from the deceased, taunted him. The Washington Supreme Court held that
this evidence had been properly excluded from the trial because, while the
defendant might in fact have killed in passion, it was not 'of a sudden.' The
court stated,

[t]his theory of the cumulative effect of reminders of former wrongs... is
contrary to the idea of sudden anger as understood in the doctrine of mitigation. In the nature of the thing, sudden anger cannot be cumulative. A
provocation which does not cause instant resentment, but which is only resented after being thought upon and brooded over, is not a provocation suf63. James Gobert, Victim Precipitation,77 CoLu. L. REv. 511, 534 n.119 (1977).

64. Singer, supra note 15, at 277 (footnote omitted).
65. 153 P. 9 (Wash. 1915).

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:742

ficient in law to reduce intentional killing from murder to manslaughter
66

The Gounagias court, beneath its legalities, announces a psychological theory that dooms the brooder and the rekindler. To this court,
strong provocations like sodomy, if not acted upon immediately, fade
into history and irrelevancy, such that only the current context matters. In such an analysis, a new and weak provocation, like a taunt,
cannot produce the sudden, red-hot passion for mitigation. As for the
nexus between present and past anger, the court severs it: the old
anger fades and cools, so there is no cumulative storehouse waiting for
a last taunt to ignite.
Gounagias may be more consistent with the legal history of "cooling-off time" than Pauline, but its "psychology" appears wrong from
beginning to end. In failing to acknowledge that some people seethe
rather than cool, or in failing to acknowledge that some people rehash
old hurts such that the past is present-the law may be putting itself
further from both psychological findings and from the jury's commonsense psychology.
The law can neither divorce itself from academic nor commonsense
psychology for long; nor can the law immure itself behind stare decisis.
Such defenses will and must crumble, for the subject of manslaughter
is inherently psychological. The objective legal rules do reflect psychological theories of human nature. These theories relate: (a) the type
and the degree of provocation to passions; (b) the heat of passion to
one's thinking (malice aforethought), acting, and the ability to control;
(c) the time to emotionally cool-off; (d) whether old hurts become history or stay current; and (e) whether new provocations are sufficient to
re-ignite old passions.
I suggest that the objective legal theory-emboddied in the rules
as a whole-was out of tune with the growing psychological literature
and understandings of human nature: this is a law vs. psychology
conflict. In addition, I suggest that the theories emboddied in the individual rules were inconsistent with one another: this is a law vs. law
conflict. But I further suggest that these rules were getting out of
tune with the commonsense psychology as represented by the jurors:
this is a law vs. commonsense justice 67 conflict. This latter conflict
may be inferred from the long running debate about whether coolingoff time was a matter to be decided by the court or the jury.
As Professor Singer notes, "[all the seventeenth and eighteenth
century cases appear to agree not only that the question of whether
the defendant has cooled off is objective, but, also that it is a question
to be decided by the court, rather than by the jury."6s In the next two
66. Singer, supra note 15, at 279.
67. NoRmAN J. FINKEL, COMMONSENSE JUSTCE: JuRORs' NOTIONS OF THE LAW (1995).

68. Singer, supra note 15, at 276.
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centuries, courts would divide, as some would throw the question to
the jury to decide. 6 9 But casting it as a "law vs. fact" question obscures the issue, for the barefaced question is factual and psychological: When has enough time passed after the provocation for the
defendant's blood to have cooled? The judges in Royley, Fisher, and
Pauline picked different cooling-off times, and their picks were
grounded more in their own hunches about human psychology than in
stare decisis.
The "law vs. fact" issue was a red herring. The claim that it was a
"legal" matter rather than "factual" served to maintain the illusion of
objectivity, thereby masking judicial subjectivity. More importantly,
it prevented the encroachment of juror subjectivity, which might lead
to widespread variability, and no "rule" at all. Judges' subjectivity,
then, under the guise of "objective" decision making or deciding a
"matter of law," forestalls the subjectivizing push that would give the
jurors' psychology freer rein to reign.
Suppressing jurors' subjectivity seemed to be the latent motive, but
suppression did not seem to be working, as rules were colliding, while
more issues were finding their way to the jurors. The objectivist was
fighting a rearguard action, delaying the subjective advance, but still
far from surrender. In fact, the objectivist's most potent weapon was
about to take the field, bearing a most pedestrian name-the "ordinary man." This man, despite his moniker, turns out to be an extraordinary conjurer, for he has the power to make individuality,
variability, and subjectivity-as well as defendants-simply
disappear.
D. The 'Ordinary Man' Who Reinforces the Rules
He is not even "the reasonable man," for "as Glandville [sic] Williams so rightly observed a century later, the reasonable man never
kills."70 But less turns out to be more in the matter of manslaughter.
At trial, the ordinary man not only takes center stage, he will fill the
spotlight, eclipsing the very defendant we are asked to judge.
Consider the following questions: "How would the ordinary man
react to the provocations faced by the defendant?" "Would the ordinary man react with murderous heat of passion?" "Would the ordinary man have malice aforethought?" "Would the ordinary man's
blood have cooled?" If answers to these questions can answer the matter at bar, then the defendant is indeed peripheral at his own trial, for
71
his actual mental state and culpability need not be measured.
69. Regina v. Kirkham, 8 Car. & P. 115, 173 Eng. Rep. 422 (England 1837); Regina v.
Albis, 9 Crim. App. 158 (1913).
70. Singer, supranote 15, at 280 n.193; Flanville Williams, Provocationand the Reasonable Man, 1954 CRi. L. REV. 740.

71. Singer, supra note 15, at 280.
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These questions, the objectivist says, are to be answered by the exemplar-average in all ways-save for the fact that there is no average
man!
In the 1863 Michigan case of Maher v. People,72 the case usually
credited with introducing the ordinary man concept, the worry was
voiced that manslaughter's mitigation might go to the wrong people.
If all it took were heated passions, then "by habitual and long continued indulgence of evil passions, a bad man might acquire a claim to
mitigation which would not be available to better men."73 A similar

concern was expressed in Jacobs v. Commonwealth, a Pennsylvania
case, where the court noted "[that a] phlegmatic man may be moved to
anger as well as the most nervous. The only difference is that it requires more to affect the one than the other .... Why then, should it
not excuse crime in the one as well as in the other."74 The "ordinary
man" levels the playing field and removes individual differences (e.g.,
low threshold, hot temper, bad character) that might lead to disparate
verdicts. The price for evening the playing field, though, is steep.
A major test for the ordinary man standard occurred in 1954, in
DirectorofPublic Prosecutionsv. Bedder,75 for the seventeen-year-old
Bedder, the defendant in the case, was not an ordinary man himselfdoctors told Bedder that he was impotent. "[N]evertheless [Bedder]
hired a prostitute with the tenuous hope of being able to perform.
When he was unable to perform, the prostitute ridiculed the defendant. He slew her in what was undeniably true rage."7 6 At trial, the

judge held that Bedder's impotence was irrelevant, and the jury was
instructed not to consider or weigh that fact. On appeal, Bedder
claimed that his impotence produced his sensitivity, and that when
the prostitute taunted and hit him "in a fracas about his inability to
perform the negotiated sexual act,"7 7 he reacted to the provocation not
as an ordinary man might, but as a highly sensitive man would. The
House of Lords, however, rejected Bedder's claim, and affirmed the
trial court's ruling.
Once we extract Bedder and substitute the ordinary man, the story
falls apart. If we ask why would the ordinary man be with a prostitute, there may be a number of reasons, but impotence would not
likely be high on the list. Yet impotence drives Bedder's actions. Similarly, the ordinary man would not likely respond with rage to either a
taunt or a slap about his impotence, if in fact the ordinary potent man
performed in an ordinary, potent way. To the ordinary man, the pros72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

10 Mich. 212 (1862).
Id. at 220.
Jacobs v. Commonwealth, 15 A. 465, 466 (1888).
1 W.L.R. 1119 (England 1954).
Singer, supra note 15, at 289.
GEORGE P.

FLETCHER, RETHINKING CmINAL LAw

248 (1978).
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titute's provocation is a non sequitur, much ado about nothing; but to
the impotent Bedder, it is a below-the-belt blow.
Bedder did not claim that his rage was proportionate to an adequate provocation. His claim was that his peculiar, individual
makeup led him to rage at the provocation. This claim stresses uniqueness, not ordinariness, and he asks to be judged on the former.
This is the claim that the Maher and Jacobs courts' feared; but fearful
or not, claimants such as Bedder hold that they cannot be judged
fairly without widening the ordinary to embrace the extraordinary.
When Homer invokes the goddess to sing "of the wrath of Peleus'
son Achilles," the reader is alerted that Achilles is different, and that
other Achaeans might not react in the same way as Achilles did to
Agamemnon's provocation. The same might be said of Odysseus with
the suitors and Hamlet with the King, as history, context, and individual sensitivities all come into play when the provocations occur. In
the alleged adultery cases of State v. John,7S Pauline v. State,79 and
Maher v. People,so these defendants were asking to be judged by the
average cuckold standard. In Regina v. Smithsi and People v. Berry,8 2
two adultery and taunting cases, defendants were asking for a cuckold/tauntee standard. In People v. Washington,83 the defendant, who
had been acting as a servient homosexual with the victim, asked that
he be judged by "an average homosexual" or a female standard. In
Gounagias,8 4 the defendant asked for a sodomized man standard,
while Bedder85 asked for an impotent young man standard. All of
these defendants were asking for standards applicable to their
circumstances.
Granting a sensitivity, however, does not automatically guarantee
a manslaughter verdict. A legal analysis might grant sensitivity on
the front end-where provocations are seen, heard, felt, interpreted,
and emotionally reacted to-and still hold that the defendant should
have controlled his rage, on the back end. Fletcher makes this point
when he writes:
It may be that the accused should have controlled himself whether he was
impotent or not, yet this is a fact that should have been decided by the jury
with full appreciation of all the pressures bearing on the event. One can
hardly say that the jury passed judgment on Mr. Bedder if they did not
even
86
consider the most significant facts that influenced his loss of control.

78. See State v. John, 30 N.C. (8 Ired.) 330 (1848).
79. See Pauline v. State, 1 S.W. 453 (Tex. 1886).
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

See Maher v. People, 10 Mich. 212 (1863).
See Regina v. Smith, 4 Fost. & F. 1066, 176 Eng. Rep. 910 (England 1866).
556 P.2d 777 (Cal. 1976).
130 Cal. Rptr. 96 (Ct. App. 1976).
See State v. Gounagias, 153 P. 9 (Wash. 1915).
See Director of Public Prosecutions v. Bedder, 1 W.L.R. 1119 (England 1954).
FLEcHER, supra note 77, at 248.
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The Bedder decision produced outrage, and within three years Parliament passed The Homicide Act of 1957,87 an Act that represents an
end to objectivity's reign. It took a decided turn toward the subjective,
where "the jury shall take into account everything both done and
said.... "88 In the United States, the Model Penal Code of 1962 would
bring subjectivity to the fore, with its language of "extreme mental or
emotional disturbance."89 The Code explicitly states that the reasonableness of an explanation or excuse "shall be determined from the
viewpoint of a person in the actor's situation under the circumstances
0
as he believes them to be."9
This new approach represents more than subjectivity's triumph
over objectivity: it is, in essence, the adoption of an idiographic approach over the general. In idiography, the unique character of the
individual is of prime concern, and in that sort of analysis, subjectivity
oftentimes dominates. But if idiography is the new direction for the
law, then an underlying tension and contradiction must be recognized.
The law has long been concerned with "the law"-finding general
rules that courts can apply across cases. Idiography seems to abandon
such hope. In the dire view, idiography becomes carte blanche permission to let juries do whatever they want in a given case, if there are no
general rules that apply across cases. But the dire view of idiography
is not the last word on the matter. Whether psychology, and a law,
can be founded on idiography will be examined later on.
Parliament and the MPC drafters no doubt believed that the idiographic course was the way to go. But on what basis did they believe
so? Perhaps they believed that idiography was more consistent with
academic psychology's understandings of human nature, though we
find little evidence that legislators and drafters were combing the empirical literature and weighing psychological findings. Perhaps they
believed that idiography was more consistent with ordinary commonsense psychology, as represented by jurors; but again, there is little
evidence that lawmakers examined any studies, or even commissioned
any, to find out what jurors believe. Thus, given the radical changes
in the law, we do not know if these idiographic and subjective changes,
or the objective rules that preceded them, are consistent with how
either academic psychology or ordinary citizens construe such
matters.
In Part IV we take up academic psychology's "psychological theory," and in Part V commonsense justice's notions of manslaughter.
Though moving from legal and conceptual arguments to a more empir87. 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, Ch. 11, pt. I, § 3 (England).
88. Singer, supranote 15, at 289 n.230 (citing Homicide Act, 1957,5 & 6 Eliz. 2, pt. I,
ch. 11, § 3 (England)).
89. MODEL PENA CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
90. Id.
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ical and earthier ground, the theoretical question is still at the fore: Is
the Law's "psychological theory" of manslaughter consistent with
either Psychology's "psychological theory," or with Commonsense Justice's notions, on the murder vs. manslaughter distinction?
IV. ACADEMIC PSYCHOLOGY TELLS A STORY
To claim that modern academic psychology has a theory of manslaughter is clearly false. What it does have is a rich history of facts
and theories relating to the central elements that comprise manslaughter. But even here, our 'history" needs to be extended into a
deeper time, as Professor Daniel Robinson9l reminds the apostles of
modern psychology: the ancient Greeks gave us not only our name
"psychology," composed of "psyche" and "logos," but notions of
"thymos," strong emotional urges, and "menos," the resentful anger
lodged in Achilles' chest, as well. And where Homer's treatment of the
murder vs. manslaughter distinction in Odysseus' case appears primitive if not offhand, Aristotle's views on such culpability distinctions
reveal sophistication and modernity.9 2
Our story, though, moves to the modernists, on three selective
fronts. The first might be called "the front end" problem. One implicit
theory embedded in the law of manslaughter involves the effects of
provocation on the emotions, cognitions, and actions-and whether
impairments so regularly result that mitigation seems the humane response to espouse. Psychologists have long studied "stressors" and
"traumas," and the findings reveal a curious parallel to the law's objectivity vs. subjectivity debate.
The second front can be called "the back end" problem, where the
law's implicit theory links the effects of emotions on self-control and
subsequent action. Can red-hot emotions, for example, cause murderous actions to result that either bypass the controlling reason entirely-like reflex actions, automatisms, or some unconscious striking
out-or, by their heat, weaken reason's ability to govern and rein in
the resulting actions? Whether affect (emotions) or cognition (reason)
is primary has been debated in the psychological literature.
After the front end and back end reviews, a third front is examined. How ordinary citizens, who will sit on juries and function as
the conscience of the community, view these matters. What is their
91. See, e.g., D

92.

imL N. ROBINSON, AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGY (1987);

DANIEL N. RoBINSON, ARISTOTLE'S PSYCHOLOGY
APJSTOTLE, NIcomAcEuN ETmcs bk. 5, Ch. 8

(1989).

(Martin Ostwald trans., 1st ed.
1962). Aristotle distinguishes four levels of acts and responsibilities: the accidental, where the injury occurs through misadventure; injury that results from a
mistake, but does not imply vice; injury that results from an act of injustice,
where there is knowledge but not deliberation; and injury that results from
choice, where the actor is an unjust and vicious man.
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psychological theory of murder vs. manslaughter, of provocations,
emotions, reason, and control? And when they face the murder vs.
manslaughter distinction in real cases, with different fact patternswhat will they do, and why will they do what they do? There is now a
rich empirical literature on this as well. But first, the front end problem and psychology's story of stress and traumas and psychological
impairments.
A.

On the Front End: The Stress-Illness Relationship

The father of modern "stress theory," Hans Selye,93 long ago documented a relationship between stress and illness. Since then, the
term has been accepted and incorporated into Diagnostic and Statistical Manuals of Mental Disorder, where "stressors" have been categorized94 on their own "Psychosocial" Axis (Axis V). In addition,
stressors have been quantified95 and correlated with a host of outcome
measures in more than two decades worth of research, and this robust
literature tells us that when stressors accumulate and the quantified
stress level is high, we often see a greater likelihood of physical (e.g.,
ulcer, heart attack) and/or psychological (e.g., anxiety, depression, suicide) illnesses. In short, a cumulative effect of stress increases the
likelihood of illness. As this finding in now well accepted, it is a customary and routine practice for clinicians to inquire about the stressors a prospective patient may have experienced in the last six
months, the last year, or the lifetime.
But where psychological research findings support and open "the
time window" to the cumulative effect of stresses, the Gounagias court
closed the time window and rejected the "theory of the cumulative effect of reminders of former wrongs." 96 The Gounagias court held, in
effect, that there were two provocations, at two discrete points in time;
one counted (e.g., the taunt), but it was insufficient, while the other
(e.g., the sodomy) did not count, because too much time elapsed; and
there was no cumulative effect. The research from academic psychology points to a cumulative effect, such that the effects of stressors do
not end at some arbitrary and discrete moment of time.
Though research yields consistent findings, there is an oddity:
while a correlation exists between stress and illness, the correlations
93. HANS SELYE, THM STRESS OF LIFE (1956).

94. AmcAN PSYCHATIc ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MiENTAL
DISORDERS, (3rd ed., revised)(DSM-III-R)(1987). Axis IV categorizes the
severity of psychosocial stressors that an individual experiences in the last year
on a 1-to-6 scale, from "none" to "catastrophic."
95. Thomas H. Holmes & Richard H. Rahe, The Social ReadjustmentRatings Scale,
11 J. OF PSYCHOSoMATIc RES. 213 (1967)(This scale quantifies various life event
stressors, such as "death of spouse," which earns 100 points, on the top end of the
scale, down to "minor violations of the law," which earns 11 points.).
96. State v. Gounagias, 153 P. 9, 14 (Wash. 1915).
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turn out to be much lower than many researchers and clinicians expected (R = .20-.30); and when we square these modest-to-low correlations to get the more important measure of variance (R2), we find that
the correlation accounts for only a small proportion of the illness variance (R2 = 4%-9%). Why these perplexingly low correlations? The
main reason, I suggest, is that in doing such scientific, objective, quantifiable research, we have left out the individual person entirely. We
no longer have an individual embedded in a unique social situation;
the idiographic has been replaced by a prototypic, much like the defendant being left out when the ordinary man exemplar is invoked.
To explicate, take the life event "death of a spouse." On the Social
Readjustment Ratings Scale, the most used measure of stress in the
research literature, every person who lost his or her spouse to death in
the last year gets 100 points. But such a "rule" treats every person
like every other person, like the mythical average person. The "rule"
eliminates individual variability from this most individual trauma:
under this "fact pattern," all people, like all defendants, are the same.
But if we imagine a room with 100 men and women who recently lost
their spouses, we might well hear stories that run from "devastation"
to "relief"-highy variable reactions. The point, here, is that the only
way we can meaningfully give points to a life event is to first find out
how this person is subjectively experiencing the event. This demands
idiography.
When psychologists attempt to generalize that which is idiographic, they may make the same sort of mistake as do the objectifiers
of the law. The consequence is losing variability, individuality, and
meaning, and ending up with deceptively low correlations that relate
more to a mythical exemplar than any particular person. By establishing the "average person," we end up describing no person. When
we switch from an objective to a subjective point of view, we see that it
is not the same event for each person who loses a spouse, save in the
most trivial sense of a label. The import is clear for provocations: we
can only determine if this event is a provocation, and how much it
provokes this defendant, by conducting some sort of idiographic and
subjective inquiry.
In the legal arena, to objectivize the inquiry by hoisting up the "ordinary person" exemplar eliminates the individual from the assessment and makes moot the moral inquiry into this defendant's
blameworthiness. Furthermore, it eliminates from consideration the
context, which provides the backdrop and ground for a full assessment. For whether the one taunted was impotent, or had been
sodomized, or had never laid eyes on the taunter, or never had been
touched, is surely relevant to the question of provocation.
There is yet another lesson to learn from the stress-illness literature. On the Social Readjustment Ratings Scale, where "death of a
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spouse" earns top prize of 100 points, 11 points attach to "minor violation of the law" at the bottom of the scale. But for one person, a minor
violation of the law may be greater than even death of a spouse. Let
us use "making obscene telephone calls" as the minor violation of the
law. If the person making such calls turns out to be a highly visible,
successful figure, and the event and his picture are splashed across
television and newspaper headlines throughout the country, and that
the disgrace is profound, with friends and colleagues calling for your
resignation.. . well this traumatic life event, beginning with a socalled minor event worth but 11 points, may be, in subjective -reality,
the most major event in this person's life.
Based on the mythical average person, this interval scale holds
that one type of provocation is worth 11 points while another is worth
100 points; in this sort of objective analysis, provocation per se
designates the points. Yet such a scale may not hold for a particular
individual, because it is the person who designates the points, and
who may order personal stressors in substantially different ways.
Thus, trying to objectively designate, differentiate, and quantify which
events are adequate provocations from those that are not, is bound to
fail for just the same reasons the objective law fails: because individuals who react in singular ways to stressors and provocations are relegated to the sidelines, replaced by a mythical exemplar.
B.

On the Back End: The Primacy of Affect or Cognition?

The "back end" question focuses on self-control, and here, academic
psychology is much more divided than on the front end. On one side of
the debate is Robert Zajonc,97 who has argued for the primacy of affect, claiming that emotion and cognition can be independent. Zajonc
believes that there are separate systems in the brain for handling
emotion and cognition, and thus it is possible for affect to "precede
cognition in a behavioral chain"9 8 or "be generated without a prior cognitive process." 99 Zajonc's position would be most compatible with
heat of passion cases, for if affect can precede cognition and trip off the
behavioral chain that leads to a killing-before cognition can enter
the chain and restrain the actor-then the actor can hardly be said to
be fully culpable for what could not stop.
Zajonc's position, when pushed to the limit, is even more compatible with exculpation than with mitigation. Maybe Zeus and Athena
had it right, in the end, for if Odysseus could not stop his emotional
chain from running its deadly course, then exculpation might have
97. Robert B. Zajonc, On the Primacy of Affect, 39 Am.PSYCHOLOGmST 117 (1984).
98. Id. at 117.
99. Id.
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been warranted. If, as Zajonc wrote in another paper,1Oo "preferences
need no inferences," then emotions can lead to action outside the cognitive process, and presumably outside the actor's ability to insert reason and restrain the process. If such emotional preferences are
irresistible-as a train without brakes-how can we blame, even to a
mitigating degree, if the train crashes?
The foremost critic of Zajonc's position is Richard Lazarus,O1 who
has argued over the years for the primacy of cognition. As Lazarus
writes:
I have taken the strongest position possible, and the most controversial, on
the causal role of cognition in emotion, namely, that it is both a necessary and
sufficient condition. Sufficient means that thoughts are capable of producing
emotions; necessary means that emotions cannot occur without some kind of
thought. Many writers who accept
comfortably the idea that cognition is suffi10 2
cient reject that it is necessary.

If, as Lazarus claims, some form of cognition is always present with
the emotion, then an exculpatory claim-"I wasn't aware and couldn't
contro"-must fail. Lazarus' view, though, can support a mitigation
claim, for he is not saying that the cognitive appraisal that occurs in
emotion is necessarily complete or accurate; rather, only that cognition is there, be it in minimalist form, or even in the form of "unconscious appraising."103
On the other side, Zajonc finds that Lazarus is inserting cognition
into emotion by definition, when the issue is empirical. Moreover,
says Zajonc, if you define the most fleeting, even unconscious registerings as instances of "cognitive appraisal," we move from the realm of
4
science to that which "cannot be observed, verified, or documented."10
In this Zajonc vs. Lazarus debate, we see that the two define "cognition" quite differently. For Lazarus, "cognition" does not map onto
"reason" neatly, as his "cognition" has forms, shadings, and subtleties
that the legal discourse omits. On the affect side, Zajonc sharply differentiates affect from cognition, as he argues that affect: (a) becomes
conscious before cognition; (b) is more important than cognition in
many areas of human behavior; (c) seems uncontrollable and inescapable; (d) does not require prior cognitive processing; and (e) seems
irrevocable by subsequent cognition. But this sharp differentiation
100. Robert B. Zajonc, Feeling and Thinking: PreferencesNeed No Inferences, 35 AM.
PSYCHOLOGISr 151 (1980).

101. Richard S. Lazarus, On the Primacy of Cognition, 39 AM. PsYcHOLOGImr 124
(1984).
102. Richard S. Lazarus, Cogniton and Motivation in Emotion, 46 Am. PsYcHOLOGIsT
352, 353 (1991).
103. Id. at 361.
104. ZaJonc, supra note 97, at 117.
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falls apart on further analysis, as Parrott and SabinilO5 demonstrate.
They show that "[clognition that is unconscious and automatic can...
be effortless and uncontrollable [and] be irrevocable by deliberate
thought."106 Moreover, in reanalyzing Zajonc's cases where he finds
affect to have primacy, Parrott and Sabini find that "there is no compelling reason to conclude that affect is independent from cognition"10 7 in such cases.

"Emotion vs. cognition," then, began as a weighty academic debate
set in extremes: two independent and dichotomous psychic variables,
like two heavyweights, vie for the crown. But based on further analysis and research, the debate itself now seems extreme, and simplistic.
As Rom Harre and Grant Gillett note, "some 20 years ago it was realized that there was an ineliminable cognitive element in the psychology of the human emotions."10
The debate, then, has been
narrowing, due in part to more sophisticated research findings which
suggest an interdependence, rather than an independence, of affect
and cognitive systems.
With more practical implications for the legal question, these findings seem to show the presence of cognition in emotions such as anger,
envy, and jealosy, to name but a few emotions that might operate during a "heat of passion" situation. Moreover, recent neuropsychological
findings of "centrifugal anatomical wiring suggests that emotion and
sensation cannot be independent from cognition."1o9 Parrott and
Schulkin advance a functional or evolutionary perspective, noting that
emotions must serve an adaptive function: if emotions prepare the
organism for action, if they steer action toward satisfaction of a need,
then this could not occur without cognitive appraisal; thus, the emotional process must involve "interpretation, memory, anticipation, and
problem-solving."11o
Arguing against the simplistic, independence view of emotion and
cognition, Parrott and Schulkin write,
[T]o consider emotions to be passions (as opposed to reason) is to make two
assumptions, both problematic. One is that all emotions are irrational, which
105. W. Gerrod Parrott & John Sabini, On the "Emotional"Qualities of Certain Types
of Cognition: A Reply to Arguments for the Independence of Cognition and Affect,
13 COGNTIV

TRAPY & REs. 49 (1989).

106. Id.
107. Id. at 58.
108. RoM HARRE & GRANT GiL.Tr, THE DIscunsivE Mum 145 (1994).
109. W. Gerrod Parrott & Jay Schulkin, Neuropsychology and the Cognitive Nature of
the Emotions, 7 COGNmON & EMOTION 43, 43 (1993). See also Joseph E. LeDoux,
Cognitive-Emotional Interactions in the Brain, 3 COGNITION & EMOTION 267
(1989)(stating that emotion and cognition are mediated by separate but interact-

ing systems of the brain); W. Gerrod Parrott & Jay Schulkin, What Sort of System
Could an Affective System Be? A Reply to LeDoux, 7 COGNITION & EMOTION 65
(1993)(arguing that emotion and sensation are not independent of cognition).
110. Parrott & Schulkin, Neuropsychology, supra note 109, at 48.
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flies in the face of experience and, if true, would be highly inconsistent with
evolutionary and functional accounts. The other assumption is that the term
"cognition" can be equated with rationality, which is surely not what is meant
by this admittedly ambiguous term in contemporary psychology.1 11

If the cognitivists have the better of the argument, and if Zajonc's
claims for affect preceding cognition and acting independently of cognition are not supported by the data in general-then the cognitivists
would counter a defendant's claim "that my passions were so aroused
that I could not think or control my actions." The counter claim would
be that the evidence suggests that some form of cognition (thinking)
does accompany passions, and that the evidence further suggests that
strong passions do not necessarily obliterate either thinking or the
possibility of control. Thus, any simplistic rule of thumb-such as "if
strong passions then no control"-would be baseless.
There is another way academic psychology contributes to the debate. Psychologists have been studying how ordinary people understand and use emotional terms. Professor James R. Averill,112 in his
study of anger and the law, takes the view that emotions "are primarfly social constructions."l1 3 If we can only judge an emotion such as
anger "by reference to social norms and standards,"114 rather than by
"individual psychology,"115 thenin judging the meaning and strength
of emotions and resultant actions, the jury "may be more 'expert' than
most psychologists and psychiatrists,"116 as they share those social
standards. In his "partial list" of normative rules relating to anger,
Averill lists the social rule that "an angry person should not be held
completely responsible for his or her behavior."1"7 This type of empirical fact involves what most people believe about murderous passions,
manslaughter, and mitigation-that they share a belief that "anger
mitigates." But this sort of empirical fact does not establish the truth
of the proposition; rather, it tells us that the "anger mitigates" belief is
common sense assumption, informing, but not disposing, of the
question.
Parrott has looked at the thoughts that occur when people are impulsively angry, and from his work another common sense assumption-about why mitigation rather than exculpation-can be
extracted.1 '5 Parrott writes:
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. at 50.
JAhms R. AVERm, ANGER AND AGGRESSION: AN ESSAY ON EMOTION (1982).
Id. at 115.
Id.
Id. at 116.
Id. at 115.
Id. at 325.
Keith Oatley, On the ScientificStudy of Angry Organisms,in VI PERsPECTIVEs ON
ANGER AND EMOTION: ADVANCES INSOCIAL COGNION 167-77 (Robert S. Wyer &
Thomas I.Srull eds., 1993).
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When people are impulsively angry, they just as impulsively think in ways
consistent with being angry. When they cease to believe that they have a
right to be angry, they stop being angry. So what is remarkable about impulsive anger is not that it can spring into being without any beliefs that one has
been wronged, but that it can spring into being based on such flimsy beliefs
that one has been wronged. 1 1 9

If people believe that there are flimsy beliefs, but not full-blown delusional beliefs, this may well be the discriminating reason for mitigating but not exculpating.
Turning from anger to the emotion of envy, Parrott and colleagues
demonstrate that the components of malign envy-hostile and depressive feelings-are associated with subjective and objective injustice
and inferiority beliefs.l 2 0 As the researchers conclude, "envy, especially in its typically hostile form, may need to be understood as resulting in part from a subjective, yet robust, sense of injustice."12-1
From this back end look at affect and cognition, passion and reason, we see dichotomies closing, with independence turning into interdependence, even into an "ineliminable mix."122 In this mix, there are
beliefs about emotions, thoughts, and control which are grounded in
subjectivity and objectivity. One such belief, a common sense assumption, is that manslaughter ought to be mitigated, a belief that accords
with the law's assumption; this accord was not always so, but the
law's subjective about-face in the second half of the twentieth century
puts the Law's path closer to the one laid by commonsense justice,
even if commonsense justice findings are not consciously driving the
change. The Law's subjective "conversion," and its convergence toward commonsense psychology, may be another example of Roscoe
Pound's prediction: that when there is a "divergence between the
standard of the common law and the standard of the public, it goes
2
without saying that the latter will prevail in the end."'1 3
C.

The Story

On this third and final front, the academic psychology germinates
a story. In their seminal work, Reconstructing Reality in the Courtroom, Lance Bennett and Martha Feldman propose that jurors transform evidence into stories.1 24 Why a story? First, a story is a handy
119. Id. at 171.
120. Richard H. Smith et al., Subjective Injustice and Inferiority as PredictorsofHostile and DepressiveFeelings in Envy, 20 PERSONALrry & Soc. PSYCHOL. BuLL. 705,
705 (1994).
121. Id.
122. HARMR& Gm=.rr, supra note 108.
123. Roscoe Pound, The Need of a SociologicalJurisprudence,19 GREEN BAG 607, 615
(1907).
124. W. LANCE BENNETr & MARrHA S. FELDMAN, RECONSTRUCTING REALITY IN THE
COURTROOM: JUSTICE AND JUDGMENT IN AmiucAN CuLTuRE (1981).
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analytic device for filtering large amounts of information. Second, a
story functions as a framework for organizing, situating, and relating
facts-the evidence as it unfolds through testimony. It is not only jurors who construct stories, but the prosecution and defense as well.
Take the prosecution's opening statement, which is a story of what
happened and why; it serves, among other things, as a map and reminder of where the prosecution's case is going, even as testimony
may be presented in confusing, fragmented, or disjointed ways.
As Bennett and Feldman put it:
If trials make sense to untrained participants, there must be some implicit
framework of social judgment that people bring into the courtroom from everyday life. Such a framework would have to be shared by citizen participants
and legal professionals alike. Even lawyers and judges who receive formal
legal training must rely on some commonsense means of presenting legal issues and cases in ways that make sense to jurors, witnesses, defendants, and
spectators.
Our search for the underlying basis of justice and judgment in American
trials has produced an
interesting conclusion: the criminal trial is organized
12 5
around storytelling.

Having given two reasons for a story, Bennett and Feldman propose a third and deeper reason. They note that "[iun isolation ... behaviors or actions are ambiguous.126 In Hamlet, for example, the
Queens drinking from the poisoned wine glass is an ambiguous act:
Is it to be construed as murder, manslaughter, suicide, accident, or
mistake? It is only when we set the act within a social context that
meaning emerges. As the authors state, "[miuch of the meaning and,
therefore, the interest and importance of social activity depends on
who does it, for what reasons, through what means, in what context,
and with what sort of prologue and denouement."127 Social context
and social activity are essential, and "[s]tories are everyday communication devices that create interpretive contexts for social action."128
How is a story constructed, and what elements go into the story?
Bennett and Feldman say that first we "locate the central action in a
story,"12 9 which, staying with Hamlet, would be the deaths of the
King, Queen, and Laertes. The interpreter must next "construct inferences about the relationships among the surrounding elements in the
story that impinge on the central action."130 This construction of a
social frame includes the scene, the act, the alleged agent, the agency,
and the purpose.1S1 It will provide background (prologue), tell who
did it, and by what means, and for what reasons, and in what context.
125. Id. at 3.
126. Id. at 7.
127. Id.
128. Id.

129. Id. at 41.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 62.
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Does the story work? Bennett and Feldman tell us that the story is
tested in essentially two ways. The first way involves the issue of internal consistency. It asks, does the story hang together as a plausible
and unequivocal account of what happened? Do the elements of the
story cohere or contradict? Or, could it have happened this way? But
any number of stories might be told that make good stories and appear internally consistent, though the tale may be false, even if welltold. Thus the second way a story is tested involves its match with
reality. The question here is, "Is the story valid?"
Reality, then, provides a check and constraint on the storyteller, 13as2
the storyteller does not "have complete freedom to create reality."
Of the two criteria, validity and internal consistency, Bennett and
Feldman give the far greater weight to consistency. They state:
On the one hand, courtroom stories must be built on definitions of the material evidence that comes from the incident in question. In this sense "the
facts" do exercise some constraint over the possible stories that can emerge in
a case. However, this constraint is considerably less binding than the conventional mythology of justice shared by most legal professionals and ordinary
citizens would indicate. Each fact introduced in evidence is subject to a whole
range of definition and placement tactics, the selection of which affects the
contextual relations between the fact and all the other evidence that has been
defined in story form .... In the final analysis, it is less the role played by
evidence in the natural event than the degree to which the evidence can be
redefined and relocated133within stories and about the event that determines
the outcome of a case.

1.

The Story of the Story

The dominant epistemological position in psychology, at least in
the first half of this century, has been logical positivism-empiricism.
Although this position took some earlier salvos, the shelling started in
earnest with Thomas Kuhn's influential work, The Structure of Scien34 as philosophers of science135 began taking dead
tific
aim Revolutions,1
and scoring direct hits. Over the last few decades, "the drubbing
that logical empiricism ...

received from philosophers of science"13 6

took its toll and produced the predicted effect-new perspectives were
spawned. Currently, psychology remains an epistemological battleground, with a retreating-but-not-yet-dead empiricism challenged by
social constructionism and scientific realism. And it is out of the last
132. Id. at 65.
133. Id. at 143-44.
134. THoMAs S. KUHN, THE STmucTURa or SciENTIIc REvOLUTIONs (1962).
135. See, e.g., P.I. FEYEmABEND, AGAINST IETHOD (1976); WnUtAR VAN ORMAN
QuINE, WoRD AND OBJEoCT (1960); STEPHEN TouLm, THE PHILOsOPHY OF SciENCE (1960).

136. W. Gerrod Parrott, Rhetoric for Realism in Psychology, 2 THEORY & PSYCHOL.
159, 159 (1992).
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two "isms," constructionism' 3 7 and realism, 138 that we find the underpinnings of the story, the story of the story.
Rom Harre,13 9 writing about the ontology of the science of psychology, puts forth the assumption "that there are at most two human realities... [the one that] comprehends our biological nature... [and
the other that] comprehends our social nature as elements of a network of symbolically mediated interactions.1 4o Harre sees social reality arising from conversational exchanges, out of language and
discourse. Psychological phenomena as remembering, learning, "emotional talk," norms, and imperatives arise from the conversational
world. From this view, story construction (and our thinking in storylike fashion), far from being a mere device, lies much closer to the essence of what it means to be a social being. Our norms, imperatives,
and moral rules may take the form of "representationssociales."141
Psychologists have been taking a new look at stories in such diverse areas as thinking, memory, moral development, social psychology, and psychotherapy. For example, Jerome Bruner142 has
proposed that there are two distinctly different modes of thought, propositional thinking and narrativethinking, and each provides "distinctive ways of ordering experience, of constructing reality." Where
propositional thinking is logical, abstract, context-independent, theoretical, and formal, narrative thinking is concrete, interpersonal, situational, and descriptive of reality. If jurors think along narrative
rather than propositional lines-a sensible assumption given that a
case is about particulars-then stories may be the jurors' natural
mode of both understanding the case and communicating their understandings to one another.
Paul Vitz, citing the work of social psychologist Theodore Sarbin,
sees the story as a "general metaphor for understanding human conduct.... The story or narrative model allows psychology to make contact with the historical context of individuals and with the insights
into human social behavior found in stories, drama, literature, and
history."'14 3 While "metaphor" would seem to imply a device for con137. See, e.g., PETER L BERGER & THoMAs LucmI,
THs SocIAL CONSTRUCTION OF
REA= (1985); Kenneth J. Gergen, The Social ConstructionistMovement in
Modern Psychology, 40 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 266 (1985).
138. See, e.g., ROM HARRE, VARmIs OF RAISM (1986); John D. Greenwood, Realism,

Empiricism and Social Constructionism: Psychological Theory and the Social
Dimensions of Mind and Action, 2 THEoRY & PSYCHOL. 131 (1992).
139. Rom Harre, Metaphysics and Methodology: Some Prescriptionsfor SocialPsychological Research, 19 EuR. J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 439 (1992).

140.
141.
142.
143.

Id. at 440.
Id. at 451.
JEROME BRuNERR, AcrUAL Mm-DS, POSSmLE WoRLDS (1986).

Paul C. Vitz, The Use of Storics in Moral Development: New Psychological Reasons for an Old Education Method, 45 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 709, 711 (1990).
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ceptualizing about people, Sarbin sees the story as more fundamental:
the story is not just something scientists make up, it is what people
use to interpret their own lives-as a story. As Sarbin puts it, "Our
plannings, our rememberings, even our loving and hating, are guided
by narrative plots."144
Finally, George Howard,145 writing about psychotherapy, asks,
"Have you noticed that therapy usually begins with an invitation to
the client to tell his or her story?" From this "constructive" view, "life"
becomes "the stories we live by," "psychopathology" becomes "stories
gone mad," and "psychotherapy" becomes "exercises in story repair."
Cutting across various psychological topics is the ubiquity of stories, and strong evidence that jurors create and use stories. Whether
storytelling is bred in the bone or born of a culture whose commerce is
stories, that nature vs. nurture question is beyond the scope of this
inquiry. What is of concern is the realism vs. relativity question. For
whether a story is "true," or merely an interesting "story," does bear
on issues of justice and fairness in general, and on the specific question of whether the "murder" or "manslaughter" story is not only the
"best fit," but the real story. But "real" and "stories" may be an odd
and irreconcilable couple, and some social constructionists espouse a
relativism that claims that truth is unobtainable, for there are only
stories, and more stories. While Homer and Shakespeare are treasured as storytellers, the same is not likely to be said of jurors, for
upon them we place a different burden, and a solemn oath: we demand more than a story, however cleverly woven; we ask that they
give us the true story-even as we know that that transcends the jurors' perceptive capacities.
2.

Story Ingredients

What are the raw ingredients that give the juror's story its substance? The obvious ingredient, which the law hopes is the only ingredient, is the evidence brought out at trial. But jurors also use
extralegal factors' 46 in reaching their decisions. One such factor,
present long before the trial commences, is their prior knowledge.
This factor, at a minimum, simply acknowledges that the jurors' slates
have already been writ upon long before the first word of testimony is
uttered. Their prior knowledge often includes specific representations
144. THEODORE R. SARBiN, NAmxATvE PSYCHOLOGY: THE SToRMD NATuRE OF HuMAN

CoNDucT 11 (Theodore R. Sarbin ed., 1986).
145. George S. Howard, Cultural Tales: A NarrativeApproach to Thinking, CrossCulturalPsychology, and Psychotherapy,46 Am. PSYCHOLOGISr 187, 194 (1991).
146. Christy A. Visher, JurorDecisionMaking: The Importance of Evidence, 11 L. &
Hum. BEHAv. 1 (1987).
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of crimes and criminals.1 4 7 These representations may take the form
of a general composite: a stereotype of the typical murderer, or the
typical manslaughter case. And while these prototypes may be
powerfully determinative of jurors' verdicts, they are likely to be distorted caricatures, off the mark of the typical and representative manslaughter or murder defendant.
The most likely source of prototypical distortion is the mass media.
As Professor Valerie Hans notes, "[blecause a relatively small proportion of the public has direct experience with the justice system, public
knowledge and views of law and the legal system are largely dependent on media representations."148 The media in all its forms saturate us with information and images relating to crime and criminals.
But this saturation "does not reflect reality," as "violent and sensational crimes... dominate media coverage of both fictional and factual
crime."149 The media's portrayal accents the extreme and the ex-

traordinary, rather than the representative. In this sense, the media
actively construct a "crime reality" which is a more violent one than
the real one. So when jurors enter the jury box, so do prior knowledge
and prototypes, accurate or not. Particularly salient may be recent
cases in the news, relevant to the murder vs. manslaughter case at
bar. Jurors may use the "availability heuristic,"150 recalling the recent, sensational, and "biased" case last heard in the news: "biased"
because what is most recent is not necessarily representative.
Another source of bias in the prior knowledge jurors bring with
them comes from interpersonal and personal accounts of crimes.
These accounts, according to Loretta Stalans, tend to be more typical
of actual crime scenarios than media portrayals, and may act as a
countervailing weight to the media's atypical portrayals.151 Yet, in
Vicki Smith's empirical work, she found little evidence of realism in
subjects' portrayals of crimes.152 For instance, when she asked sub-

jects to write down all the attributes they could think of in connection
with certain crimes, murder being one of them, the typical features
they listed were significantly discrepant from the defining criteria
that were specified by law. For example, subjects used murder as any
intentional killing, but many intentional killings are manslaughter.
147. Vicki L. Smith, Prototypes in the Courtroom: Lay Representations of Legal Concepts, 61 J. PERSONAL=TY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 857 (1991).
148. Valerie P. Hans, Law and the Media: An Overview and Introduction, 14 L. &
HuM. BEHAV. 399, 399 (1990).
149. Id.
150. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics
and Biases, 185 SOL 1124 (1974).
151. Loretta J. Stalans, Citizens' Crime Stereotypes, Biased Recall, and Punishment
Preferencesin Abstract Cases: The EducativeRole of InterpersonalSources, 17 L.
& Hum. BEHAV. 451 (1993).
152. Smith, supra note 147, at 867.
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Story Construction

The most elaborated and well-researched model of story construction is Nancy Pennington and Reid Hastie's "Story Model" of juror decision making.'5 3 These researchers propose, as did Bennett and
Feldman, that jurors construct narrative story structures to organize
and interpret evidence, and this process is explanation-based: jurors
seek to explain the facts by inferring causal and intentional links
among particular facts.154 In this constructive process, case-specific
information acquired during the trial, knowledge about events similar
in content to those that are the topic of dispute, and generic expectations about what makes a complete story are combined. This results
in one or more interpretations"that have a narrative story form."355
If, as Pennington and Hastie believe, the jurors' task is fundamentally
interpretative,then idiography not only enters, but must enter.
With story construction being both subjective and interpretative,
we arrive once again at the relativist's and novelist's position that the
same set of facts can spawn more than one story. Yet Pennington and
Hastie state that "one story will usually be viewed as more acceptable
than the others."156 On what grounds is one story selected as the
story?
Pennington and Hastie cite a number of principles; coverage, coherence, uniqueness, completeness, and plausibility.157 Of these principles coverage, consistency, completeness, and, to some extent,
uniqueness, all refer to what Bennett and Feldman called "internal
consistency," or what the novelist means, when asking, "Is it a good
yarn?" But where is validity? That comes in through plausibility,
though even this "objective" term may be highly culturally relative.
Like Bennett and Feldman, Pennington and Hastie give greater
weight to internal consistency over external validity: it is the subjective note that is stressed, the objective note, less so. 158 Where Pennington and Hastie go beyond Bennett and Feldman is by empirically
153. Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Explaining the Evidence: Tests of the Story
Model for Juror Decision Making, 62 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL., 189
(1992). See REnm HASwiE ET AL., INSIDE THm JURY (1983); Nancy Pennington &
Reid Hastie, Evidence Evaluationin Complex DecisonMaking, 51 J. PERSONALITY
& Soc. PSYCHOL. 242.

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

BEmNr & FELDmAN, supra note 124.
Pennington & Hastie, Explaining the Evidence, supra note 153, at 190.
Id.
Id.
But see JOHN SAINI & MAURY SILVER, MoRALITIEs OF EVERYDAY LiE 183-220
(1982). These authors point out the confusion over "objectivity" and "subjectivity." They argue for a distinction between an evaluation and a reaction. When an
art critic gives an evaluation of a painting-"it is not a major work"-this is not a
purely subjective evaluation, but more objective; on the other hand, a novice's
reaction-"I don't like it"-is subjective. When two baseball fans disagree over
the question of whether player X is "a great player," they disagree over their con-
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demonstrating that the story model provides a better fit with jury decision making than other models, be they legal or mathematical models of integrating and weighing information and reaching culpability
decisions.
From the front end of how provocations are construed psychologically, to the back end of how emotions and cognitions effect actions
and control, "idiography" and "subjectivity" have been centrally situated in the psyche and in academic psychology. Now, with jurors and
the stories they weave, the process is replete with construing, constructing and interpreting. Objectivity and facts play a part, but the
smaller part. The jurors' idiographic approach-where subjective
subtext, sentiments, and prototypes abound-is unleashed to shape
the facts into a psychological and subjective narrative of what happened-a story. Hamlet said, "The play's the thing wherein III catch
the conscience of the king";15 9 and for jurors, in their role as conscience of the community, it is the story which comes dispositively into
play, to weigh the blameworthiness of this defendant and prince.
V. AN EXPERIMENTAL LOOK AT TWO BENCH MARK CASES
From research findings about what jurors do and construe, "stories" were the general finding, "idiography" was the leaning, and "subjectivity" was the shading.160 But general findings may not apply in a
particular case, and it is in the particulars where we find the richest
stories. In the experiments that follow, jurors will confront a specific
defendant with specific case facts; some of those case facts will be
manipulated (i.e., the independent variables), and their verdict (i.e.,
murder vs. manslaughter) and reasons for their verdicts are the dependent variables. In this experimental way, their construals of the
case, the factors they find relevant and determinative, and whether
they take an objective or subjective perspective, should emerge in
sharpest focus.
Two of the bench mark cases that were formative in the evolution
of manslaughter law-the cases of Bedderl61 and Gounagias162 along with variations, will be manipulated to test a number of manslaughter-related issues. Our first question is: How will varying the
type and degree of provocation, type of emotion, history and context,
time and cooling-off, and brooder and rekindler scenarios effect mock
jurors' verdicts? More specifically, which variables will produce more
manslaughter verdicts, and which will yield more murder verdicts? In
clusions, but they agree about the relative evaluative dimensions. Thus, what
159.
160.
161.
162.

first seems to be a purely subjective judgment is not.
SHA SPEARE, supra note 18, at act 2, sc. 2.
See supra notes 124-59 and accompanying text.
Director of Public Prosecutions v. Bedder, 1 W.L.R. 1119 (England 1959).
State v. Gounagais, 153 P. 9 (Wash. 1915).
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using the experimental method, which takes us beyond the correlational and suggestive, cause and effect relationships become clearer.
The second general question brings in discursive, narrative, and
categorical analyses, for we are not only interested in verdicts-which
tell us what respondents do under certain fact patterns-but their
reasons for their verdicts-which tell us why they do what they do.
We ask respondents' for their reasons for both their verdict and sentencing decisions, and we ask them to identify those factors that they
find relevant and determinative. The second question, then, is: Will
these commonsense reasons match, or depart from, the objective, legal
rules regarding manslaughter?
A. Research Design
In the first experiment, 95 college students were given two cases,
in random order, and were asked to make verdict and sentencing decisions and provide reasons for their decisions. The two cases were variants of Bedder and Gounagias,called State v. Bedder and New Mexico
v. Cooper.
In Bedder, the State is bringing a second degree murder charge
against Mr. Bedder, while Bedder claims that it was only manslaughter. Three variables were manipulated-context, provocation, and
emotion. For the variable context, there were two variations: one variation, closest to the actual Bedder case, reveals that the seventeenyear-old Bedder was told by several doctors that he was impotent,
with the cause being physical and not correctable; in the second variation, the subjects are told that Bedder could not perform the sexual act
with the prostitute, as in the first variation, but they are not told of
the impotence factor. Thus, in terms of context, subjects get either the
impotence or no impotence variation. The question here is: Will the
contextual history of impotence produce more manslsaughter verdicts
and lighter sentences?
The second variable involves provocation, and there are two levels:
in one variation, the prostitute laughs and taunts Bedder, and in the
second variation she slaps Bedder in addition to laughing and taunting. This represents the taunts vs. assault and battery distinction.
The question here is: Will the increased provocation increase the percentage of manslaughter verdicts?
The final variable is the type of emotion that Bedder claims and
displays. In one variation, it is said that Bedder became enraged
when the prostitute either taunted or slapped him, and after he repeatedly stabbed her and ran out of the room, another customer and
prostitute testify that they saw Mr. Bedder looking enraged. In the
second version, Bedder claims that he became frightened when the
prostitute started taunting or slapping, and in this version, when he
runs out, the other customer and prostitute testify that he looked
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scared. The question here is: Will subjects be more sympathetic to
the emotion of fear as opposed to Achilles-like anger, and will fear lead
to more manslaughter verdicts? Thus, for the Bedder case, we have a
factorial design with eight different scenarios (2 context x 2 provocation x 2 emotion).
In the Cooper case, the vignette lets the mock jurors know that the
State has brought a murder charge against Mr. Cooper, alleging that
Cooper stabbed his co-worker Mr. Santiago to death with malice aforethought. The death took place in a Sante Fe restaurant where both
men were employed. Cooper admits that he stabbed Mr. Santiago but
claims that the act was provoked and justified as a result of unusual
and mitigating circumstances. While there are eight different conditions, the size of the two men is held constant: Cooper is a 37-year-old
man who stands 5'3" and weighs 118 pounds, while the 30-year-old
Santiago stands 6'4" and weighs 265 pounds.
Our first condition parallels the Gounagias fact pattern, where
Santiago sodomizes Cooper one night, and Cooper leaves the restaurant angry and humiliated. For the next three weeks, Santiago repeatedly taunts Cooper, who finally picks up a knife and stabs
Santiago to death following the last taunt. While this version represents a rekindling case, we call it "frequent rekindling" (FR), since the
taunts occur often. This version features a sodomy (S) followed by frequent rekindling (FR) and a death occurring three weeks (3W) later,
and is designated as S-FR-3W. In a second version, we test the effect
of only one rekindling episode (RE), instead of frequent rekindling.
Here, Cooper returns to the restaurant three weeks later to pick up
his final paycheck and Santiago taunts him; Cooper then kills. This
second version (S-RE-3W), when compared to the first, tests whether
frequent rekindling will reduce the harshest verdicts and lower
sentences more so than will a single rekindling episode. The third
version tests brooding vs. rekindling cases: here, Cooper returns to
the restaurant after three weeks, sees Santiago, who makes no taunts,
yet Cooper picks up the knife and stabs Santiago (S-BR-3W). If the
brooder case is perceived more like a premeditated murder than a rekindling case, we would expect harsher verdicts and stiffer sentences
here.
The essential feature of either rekindling or brooding cases is that
time has passed between the provocation (e.g., the sodomy) and the
killing, and that time may allow for blood to cool or for malice aforethought to form. In the next two conditions, we manipulated time by
expanding it, or shrinking it. In condition four (S-RE-6M), Cooper returns to the restaurant six months (6M) later t.o pick up his last check,
and Santiago taunts him, and then Cooper kills. This condition is
identical to condition two (S-RE-3W), except that the time interval has
now expanded to six months. The question here is: Because of the
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added time, will more jurors see this as murder done in cold blood
rather than manslaughter? In the fifth condition "time" shrinks to
zero: this becomes a heat of passion (HP) case, where Cooper kills
immediately (IM) after being sodomized (S-HP-IM), and this condition
serves as a control group for the rekindling and brooding cases.
There is still another control group which leaves in the taunt (TN)
but takes out the sodomy (NS-TN-IM): here, in the sixth condition,
Cooper is not sodomized but kills Santiago after the latter makes certain taunting comments which Cooper alleges brought back hurtful
memories from his past. This condition should yield the fewest manslaughter verdicts, if the sodomy is indeed the crucial provocation. If
the sodomy is irrelevant, as the Gounagias court claimed, then the
verdicts and sentences in NS-TN-IM should look like S-RE-3W, as
both defendants kill immediately after a taunt.
The last two conditions push the variable context even further. In
both cases, the defense presents historical evidence that Cooper was
raised by a physically abusive father; thus when the sodomy occurs
Cooper's slate and psyche are not blank, but already sensitized, like
Bedder was sensitized by his impotence. In the simple heat of passion
case, the sodomy is the provocation, and there is no context to speak
of; in the rekindling or brooding cases, the taunt or the sight of the
victim is the provocation, the sodomy becomes a contextual element,
and we will see if mock jurors use the sodomy fact as part of the provocation matrix. Now, we will see if jurors widen and extend context
still further to include evidence from the distant past. In condition
seven (H-S-RE-3W), there is history (H) of physical abuse, sodomy, the
rekindling taunt three weeks later, and the killing. In condition eight
(H-S-BR-3W), there is history of abuse, sodomy, and the brooder who
sees the victim three weeks later, and kills.
The focus of this work is the murder vs. manslaughter distinction,
and while the Bedder and Cooper cases frame the issue that way, it is
possible that jurors will see other alternatives. For example, even
though the State does not bring a first degree murder charge, some
jurors might see premeditation and a first degree murder verdict possibility-particularly when Cooper broods or kills after six months.
Some mock jurors might see involuntary manslaughter in one of the
Bedder conditions. And it is possible that some might excuse Cooper
or Bedder on grounds of either self-defense or insanity. As we are interested in how ordinary people frame and construe such cases, we
widened the verdict options beyond what a judge might give in such
cases: the mock jurors have seven verdict options, along with legal
definitions, for: guilty of (a) first degree murder, (b) second degree
murder, (c) voluntary manslaughter, (d) involuntary manslaughter, or
not guilty by reason of (e) self-defense, (f) insanity, or (g) a straight
"not guilty."
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Table 1.
Voluntary Manslaughter (VM) and Second Degree Murder
(SM) Verdicts for the Bedder and Cooper Cases, by
Conditions
Verdict
Case

Condition
Bedder
Cooper
Bedder

Cooper

B.

n

VM

SM

%

n

%

Context-Impotence
Context-No Impotence
Provocation-Laugh
Provocation-Slap

30
51
13
17
15
15

32
54
30
33
32
31

65
44
31
34
32
33

Emotion-Anger

14

29

34

71

Emotion-Fear

16

34

31

66

68
46
70
67
68
69

No Sodomy (NS-TN-IM)

1

9

10

91

Reldndler (S-FR-3W)

5

45

6

55

Rekindler (S-RE-3W)

11

85

2

15

Brooder (S-BR-3W)
Time (S-RE-6M)
Heat of Passion (S-HP-IM)
History (H-S-RE-3W)

3
9
9
9

25
75
64
75

9
3
5
3

75
25
36
25

History (H-S-BR-3W)

4

40

6

60

Results and Discussion

There is no significant order effect (i.e., which case comes first in
the booklet) and no significant gender effect, but there is a significant
case effect: the Bedder case produces significantly more second degree
murder verdicts and fewer manslaughter verdicts than the Cooper
case. The Cooper case also produces greater variability in verdicts,
with 20% of the verdicts falling outside the second degree murder and
voluntary manslaughter categories, whereas only 1% fell outside the
two main categories for Bedder. To simplify the analysis, the few first
degree murder verdicts were combined with second degree murder,
and the few involuntary manslaughter and insanity verdicts were
combined with voluntary manslaughter. Table 1 presents the verdict
results. Approximately two-thirds of the verdicts in Bedder are second degree murder, whereas slightly more than half the verdicts are
voluntary manslaughter in the Cooper case. Now looking at the particular variables in the Bedder case, a log-linear analysis reveals that
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neither context (impotence vs. no impotence), nor provocation (laugh
vs. slap), nor emotion (fear vs. anger) produce a significant effect on
verdict.
In contrast, the Cooper case reveals a number of significant differences. First, in what was not obvious to the Gounagias court but is to
these mock jurors, the sodomy makes a difference: when there is no
sodomy but only a taunt, the voluntary manslaughter verdicts are the
lowest, at 9%; when the sodomy occurs and Cooper kills in the heat of
passion, voluntary manslaughter verdicts rise to 64%; and when the
killing occurs three weeks after the sodomy, following frequent rekindling episodes or a single episode, manslaughter verdicts are 45% and
85%, respectively. A second significant difference occurs between
brooding and rekindling cases, with brooders being judged more
harshly: the rekindling cases average approximately 70% manslaughter verdicts, whereas brooding cases average about 40%.
There are also surprising nonsignificant differences. For one, time
does not seem to matter. For example, there is no significant difference between the immediate killing in the heat of passion and the rekindling case where the killing occurs three weeks later; in addition,
there is no significant difference between the three week and the six
month rekindling cases. Hence, "cooling off time," an issue so central
for the courts, seems moot for these mock jurors. Finally, the background context variable was not significant. Thus, while sodomy is a
central contextual factor, the jurors limit the contextual field and give
little weight to distant past history, in this case.
"Verdict" is not the only measure of a defendant's "blameworthiness." It is quite possible for verdicts to mask true differences, as
when two defendants get the same verdict, yet jurors judge them differently. To get a fuller picture, we also examined "sentencing decisions" as a second dependent measure. Mock jurors had the option of
sentencing defendants to jail time-from "no time" up to "life imprisonment." Our decision was not to restrain jurors' predilections by providing sentencing ranges for the verdicts, so a more open sentencing
format was used; while this may yield sentences lower and higher
than what a judge might give using guidelines, what we get here is
"community sentiment" unfettered. The sentences for the Bedder and
Cooper cases, by conditions, are presented in Table 2.
An ANOVA shows significant main effects in the Bedder case for
provocation and emotion. Sentences are lower when the provocation is
a slap rather than a taunt, and sentences are lower when the emotion
is fear rather than anger. There is also a significant provocation x
emotion interaction effect: the presence of fear with just a taunt produces equally low sentences to fear with a slap; but when the emotion
changes to anger, the taunt condition is the most severely punished,
more than anger and slap.
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Table 2
Sentences (in months) for Bedder and Cooper, by Condition
Case
Bedder

Cooper

Condition
Context-Impotence
-No Impotence
Provocation-Laugh
-Slap
Emotion-Anger
-Fear
Provocation x Emotion Interaction
Laugh-Anger
Laugh-Fear
Slap-Anger
Slap-Fear
No Sodomy (NS-TN-IM)
Rekindler (S-FR-3W)
Rekindler (S-RE-3W)
Brooder (S-BR-3W)
Time (S-RE-6M)
Heat of Passion (S-1HP-IM)
History (H-S-RE-3W)
History (H-S-BR-3W)

Prison
Sentence
183.8
151.2
195.2
139.8
222.5
112.5
277.8
112.6
167.3
112.4
286.4
80.2
66.0
142.0
80.0
97.7
57.5
164.4

The context effect turns out to be not significant; in fact, sentences
are higher in the impotence than in the no impotence condition. Some
jurors invoke the idea of negligence or recklessness in their reasons:
they argue that Bedder knew he was impotent and chose to put himself in a situation where failure and provocation were all but inevitable; like the drinker who choses to drive, Bedder bears additional
culpability, in this analysis, for the outcome.
For the Cooper case, there is a large significant effect among the
eight conditions. Planned comparisons revealed the following significant differences. The one condition where there was no sodomy (NSTN-IM) receives significantly higher sentences than all of the sodomy
cases. The brooder cases receive significantly higher sentences than
either the rekindling cases or the heat of passion case. There are interesting nonsignificant findings as well. There is no significant difference between the heat of passion condition and the rekindling
cases. Furthermore, "time" does not seem to matter, again, as there
are no significant differences among six month rekindling (S-RE-6M),
three week rekinding (S-RE-3W), and the immediate, heat of passion
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killing (S-HP-IM). As with verdicts, distant context has little effect on
sentencing.
Up to this point, mock jurors' objective judgments of verdict and
sentence have been aggregated and analyzed, creating, in effect, the
"average VM juror" or the "average SM juror" judgment. This sort of
"mythic average juror" composite is open to the same sort of criticism I
levelled earlier-that no such "average juror" exists. But more troubling than that is the possibility that verdicts and sentences do not tell
us the why of the story. To get at the why, and to bring the idiographic into the method, the mock jurors' reasons for their verdicts
were examined.
These reasons were categorized using a nine construct schema that
proved reliable. The constructs were the following: first degree murder mens rea (Cl); second degree murder mens rea (C2); objective reasonable person standard (C3); emotion/passion (C4); provocation (C5);
context (C6); time (C7); threat (C8); and control (C9). These constructs were coded as either 0 or 1, with 0 being at the manslaughter
end, while 1 is at the murder end. For example, where the absence of
premeditation is mentioned by the jurors giving manslaughter, this
construct is coded as 0, and when the presence of premeditation is
mentioned by the jurors giving second degree murder, it is coded at 1;
if the juror mentions neither, it is not scored. Table 3 presents the
number of citings for each construct, and the construct's rank as a
manslaughter (VM) construct, as a second degree murder (SM) construct, and overall.
Table 3
Frequency (n) and Ranking (R) of the Constructs, for
Manslaughter(VM) and Murder (SM) Verdicts, and Overall
Constructs

VM

SM

Overall

R

n

R

C1 First Degree mens rea

58

2

10

7

68

6

C2 Second Degree mens rea

55

3

65

1

120

2

C3 Standard
C4 Emotion/Passion

49
66

6
1

35
63

6
2

84
129

5
1

C5 Provocation

45

7

54

5

99

4

C6
C7
C8
C9

54
42
1
52

4
8
9
5

7
6
57
58

8
9
4
3

61
48
58
110

7
9
8
3

Context
Time
Threat
Control

n

R

n

787
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Some constructs seem central to mock jurors who reach either a
VM or SM verdict. For example, the emotion/passion (C4) construct
ranks first as a VM construct and second as an SM construct; while
relevant for both groups, the VM jurors see high levels of emotion/
passion operating, whereas the SM jurors see insufficient emotion. In
a similar vein, both VM and SM subjects cite the malice aforethought
factor (C2), but see it as either absent or present. Other constructs are
used differently by the two groups. For example, context (C6) is quite
relevant to VM jurors, but almost irrelevant to the SM jurors. In reverse, threat (C8), which is seen as insufficient by SM jurors, plays a
prominent role for them, but not so for the VM jurors. Two initial
conclusions emerge: (1) VM and SM jurors are construing the case
through some different constructs, which each group finds relevant to
their verdict; and (2) when they are invoking the same constructs,
they construe the defendant at different ends of the construct
continuum.
A stepwise regression was run to see which constructs predict the
verdict (see Table 4). A seven variable model emerges (R2 = 68.3, F
Table 4
Stepwise Regression Results for Construct Variables that
PredictVerdict
Construct
C4
C8
C7
C5
C2
C9
C6

Emotion/Passion
Threat
Time
Provocation
Second mens rea
Control
Context

Partial R2

Model R2

F

P

.2398
.2305
.0592
.0938
.0266
.0265
.0060

.2398
.4703
.5296
.6234
.6500
.6765
.6825

59.3
81.4
23.4
46.1
14.0
15.0
3.4

.0001
.0001
.0001
.0001
.0002
.0001
.0655

Note-The overall R 2 of this 7 Variable Model = 68.25, and the overall F
[7,182] = 55.89, p<0001.

[7,182] = 55.9, p<.0001), with two variables-Cl and C3-dropped
from the model because they did not predict. The most predictive variable is emotion (C4), which is subjectively inferred rather than determined through objective assessment. The variable threat (C8) is the
second most predictive variable, and here the SM jurors view this
more objectively, whereas VM jurors view it subjectively. Other predictive variables, like time (C7), provocation (C5), control (C9), and
context (C6), are construed more subjectively by the VM verdict jurors
and more objectively by the SM jurors.
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To this point, we have been viewing constructs individually, as if
they are independent of one another. But they are not: these constructs are correlated, in differing degrees. To get a broader view by
seeing which constructs cluster together, a cluster analysis was run.
Three clusters emerge, and account for .6261 percent of the variance
(see Table 5). The first cluster, containing two variables (C2 and C4),
may be called "intent vs. emotion, or reason vs. passion." Not only do
Table 5
Results from an Oblique Principal Component Cluster
Analysis
Cluster
VariablesVariation
Explained

1 C2
C4
2 C5
C8
C9

Second mens rea
Emotion/Passion
Provocation
Threat
Control

Proportion of
Name

Cluster

"Intent v. Emotion"
"Reason v. Passion"
"Control"

.6362

.6613

3 C1 First mens rea
C3 Standard
C6 Context

C7 Time

"Subjective
Reasonable Person"

.5945

Note-The total proportion of the variation explained

=

.626

we have the two most frequently cited constructs together here, but
this cluster seems to represent the essence of the legal debate. If emotion is great, it negates malice aforethought, and if emotion is not
great enough, intent to kill may be present. So here, jurors are balancing the emotion factor against the intent factor. In cluster two,
provocation, threat, and control (C5, C8, and C9) cluster together, and
we call this "control." Jurors seem to be judging the degree of provocation, the sort of threat that might pose, and the degree of control the
defendant had. These factors seem to be an admixture of objective
and subjective factors. Control seems more subjective, requiring an
inference into what is not observable, while provocation and threat
can be viewed either subjectively or objectively. Finally, the third
cluster involves four variables (C1, C3, C6, and C7), and it is called the
"subjective reasonable person." Here, the context factor, as in Bedder's impotence and Cooper's sodomy, plays a dominant part. Context
affects and subjectivizes "time," as rekindling makes the past present.
Context also subjectivizes the objective reasonable person, for we
must see the drama through the subjective eyes of the defendant, who

1995]

789

MURDER/MANSLAUGHTER DISTINCTION

did not premeditate. Thus, while objective and subjective factors mix,
and mix in differing ways, there is a decidedly subjective caste, particularly so for the VM verdict jurors.
Finally, we ran a canonical discriminant analysis, which shows the
degree to which different constructs predict either a VM or SM verdict
(see Table 6). The model was significant (F [9,180] = 43.3, p<.0001), in
that constructs, weighted either positively or negatively, do discrimiTable 6
Results from a CanonicalDiscriminantAnalysis
Construct
C1
C2
C3
C4
C5
C6
C7
C8
C9

R2

F

.03
6.3
First mens rea
.16
29.2
Second mens rea
.00
.02
Standard
.32
59.3
Emotion/Passion
.02
4.0
Provocation
.07
12.5
Context
32.2
.17
Time
.20
37.9
Threat
12.1
.06
Control
Class Means on Canonical Variables
Verdict
Voluntary Manslaughter (0)
Second Degree Murder (1)

p
.01
.0001
.8997
.0001
.046
.0005
.0001
.0001
.0006

Raw Canonical
Coefficient
-0.047
-0.797
-0.197
-1.160
-1.088
0.563
1.813
2.697
-0.954
CAN 1
1.698
-1.262

nantly predict the VM or SM verdicts. As one might intuitively predict, the higher the provocation, the higher the emotion, the higher
the threat, and the lower the intent to kill, the greater the likelihood
of a VM verdict; the converse would lead to a SM verdict.
Mock jurors do discriminate, but they do not restrict their constructs and discriminations solely to the legally designated dimensions. Take the Bedder case. The legal fight was over whether jurors
should hear about his impotence, and, if they did, whether that contextual factor would then subjectivize the provocation and magnify his
emotion to a point where jurors would believe that manslaughter was
the appropriate verdict. Our mock jurors who heard of his impotence,
however, were no more inclined toward a VM verdict than those who
did not, and they were not inclined to reduce his sentence either. Why
not? It seems that these mock jurors widened the contextual field to
consider contributory negligence or recklessness-placing yourself in
a situation you should know increases the danger.
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In Bedder, in the sentencing data, there is confirmation of the long
held legal view that a slap is an adequate provocation, but a taunt is
not-at least not when a taunt concerns sexual performance. We also
see that jurors weigh the particularemotion-fear or anger-differently, in their sentencing decisions: a one word change from "anger"
to "fear" produced a significant reduction in the sentences handed out.
This suggests that people are more sympathetic to "scared" than "enraged," and further suggests that it may not be just the heat of passion, but type of passion, that will determine verdict.
In Cooper, we have a number of disparities between what the
Gounagias court said and did, and with what mock jurors did and
said. First, where Gounagias was found guilty of second degree murder, Cooper, in the rekindling case, gets manslaughter 85% of the
time. Beyond the sizable verdict difference is the reason for the difference: mock jurors weigh the context of the sodomy heavily, where the
Gounagias court gave it no weight at all. In doing so, mock jurors thus
extend "time" beyond the legal "moment of the act." In a psychological
sense, jurors shrink "time," as the poet penned, such that "time past"
now becomes "time present." Yet, their "shrinking" of time was
neither unrestrained nor indiscriminant, for where they include the
relevant sodomy in their decision making, they do not use the distant
history of abuse to mitigate further. Put another way, "relevant context" is bounded, for it does not extend, as in some fearful infinite regress, back into a Freudian font that washes away all sins.
In bringing the sodomy into the context, a strong subjective caste
to their analysis results, for the very taunts that would not be enough
for Bedder, and would not be enough for the non-sodomized Cooper,
now become more than adequate for the sodomized Cooper. Thus, we
cannot say, as we might of a rose, that "a taunt is a taunt is a taunt."
The provocation is subjective, determined in part by the contextual
history of the defendant, which then affects attributions about how
much emotion he is feeling, his sense of threat, and his degree of
control.
Construing the case and making attributions about the defendant
are both relevant and determinative of verdict. While case facts are
important and do produce verdict discriminations among various conditions, the jurors' constructions are even more discriminating and
dispositive of verdict. Facts, the objective ground, are extracted, construed, and translated into a subjective story, where psychological attributions and interconnections are made.
One finding is that mock jurors make different attributions about
the brooder than the rekindler. For the brooder, because there is not
even a taunt at the moment of the deadly act, mock jurors are more
likely to construe premeditation or malice aforethought. For example,
had Laertes not said a single provocative word to Hamlet about sword,
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poison, and King, and had Hamlet let his rapier do its work anyway,
then Hamlet would fit the brooder profile, and jurors, by this work,
would be less than kind. In contrast to the brooder who seems to be
reacting to some inner stimulus, the rekindler reacts to something in
the external world, what the victim does or says, or, in the Hamlet
example, the provocative words of Laertes. Mock jurors seem to understand how external, objective, and hence "real"taunts and provocations can awaken sleeping passions; beyond simply understanding
this, their verdicts and reasons reveal greater sympathy and mitigation for the rekindler than for the brooder.
VI. A SECOND EXPERIMENT-REFINING, EXTENDING, AND
REPLICATING
A.

Research Design

No one experiment can answer all questions, and even if it answers
many, it often raises new questions to consider. Here, both leftover
and new questions remain. Thus, to refine, extend, and replicate
these first findings, and to pursue some vexing questions that remain,
a second experiment was conducted.
Though we learned that mock jurors engage in complex construing
of the case, we were surprised at the large verdict differences between
our versions of the Bedder and Gounagias cases; specifically, we were
surprised that the impotence factor in Bedder accounted for little. The
finding that we did not anticipate-the jurors would construe contributory negligence or recklessness-Bedder putting himself at riskmay have been the reason.
But this may not have been the reason, or the entire reason. There
is another suspect that emerges from the comments of a few respondents, who pointed to the fact that Bedder stabbed the prostitute repeatedly. When we designed the original case, we put in "repeated
stabbings" to create the sense of "heat of passion;" however, a few respondents construed "repeated stabbings" in a more malevolent, murderous way, suggesting that Bedder may have even intended to kill;
that construal would tilt the case toward murder. If many respondents were construing the case that way, even without commenting on
it, this could clearly account for why the murder verdicts were so
numerous.
To test this, we changed the Bedder case such that now, Bedder
stabs the prostitute once, and runs out like before. As we found that
the specific type of emotion-anger or fear-did not make a difference,
we only used "anger" this time, and where witnesses testify that when
Bedder ran out he looked enraged. Now, having an angry defendant
who stabs the victim once, we again manipulate the context factor (impotence vs. no impotence) and the provocation factor (laugh vs. slap).
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We also made some simplifications in our Cooper case, to refine,
extend, and replicate the findings most germane to manslaughter. We
eliminated the cases conveying historical abuse, which had no effect,
and the long time delay (6 months), which had no effect, and the nonsodomy case, which was a control condition. What remains are four
conditions: a heat of passion case, where the killing occurs right after
the sodomy; a frequent rekindling case, which most closely matches
the actual Gounagias fact pattern, where taunts occur for three
weeks; a rekindling case, where the taunt occurs after a three week
interval; and a brooding condition, where there is no taunt but a killing after a three week interval.
We also made some simplifications regarding verdict options.
Since the vast majority of verdicts were either second degree murder
or voluntary manslaughter in the first experiment, we left those options, plus "other," and did away with first degree murder, involuntary
manslaughter, not guilty by reason of self-defense, not guilty by reason of insanity, and not guilty. Respondents again had to state reasons for their verdict and sentencing decisions.
Our new variable in this second experiment involves instruction.
In the first experiment, all respondents received detailed "Instructions
to the Jury" covering duty to follow instructions, presumption of innocence, burden of proof, and reasonable doubt. They also received specific instructions defining each verdict and its key terms (e.g., malice
aforethought, provocation). Had we only been interested in generalizing to a trial situation, we would have left the realistic instructions as
is; however, here we are interested in the intuitive, commonsense constructions of murder and manslaughter that mock jurors are likely to
possess, and which may be muted by instructions given by the judge.
To test this possibility, half the mock jurors get detailed instructions
as in the first experiment for general issues (i.e., presumption of innocence) and the specific charges (i.e., second degree murder and manslaughter). The other half received a "no instruction" instruction,
which read as follows:
To reach a verdict, you need to know the specific legal definitions of second

degree murder and voluntary manslaughter, along with some general matters. At this point in a trial, the judge would give the jurors instructions. But
in this experiment, we are not giving you such instructions; rather, we want
you to exercise your common sense and common understanding of these

charges, and make your decision as you see it.
To summarize, mock jurors were assigned to either the instruction
or no instruction condition. Then, they recieved one of the four Bedder
cases and one of the four Cooper cases, in random order. There were
110 mock jurors in experiment II.
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B. Results and Discussion
First, there is no significant order effect on verdict, so it does not
matter whether the Bedder or Cooper case comes first or second in the
booklet. And, as before, there is no gender effect, in that the verdicts
of men and women respondents, regarding these male defendants, do
not significantly differ. Moving to the independent variables, there is
no significant instructioneffect: respondents who get detailed instructions from the judge, and those who do not, reach essentially the same
verdicts. Given this finding, we may infer that the judicial instructions used in the first experiment did not suppress, distort, or channel
jurors' initial and unfettered verdicts-for the direct comparison here
shows no difference.
Significant differences occur on the case variable (X
[1, N=110] = 14.3, p<.001), as they had in experiment I: across the
varying conditions, 65% of the Bedder verdicts are second degree murder (SM), but only 40% of all the Cooper verdicts are SM. Once again,
the Cooper case in general evokes more manslaughter verdicts, and
the case difference widens when we examine particular conditions.
Turning to the Bedder case, the 65% SM verdict finding, which was
almost identical to the first experiment results, suggests that our
change of the case (from multiple stabbings to one stab) had no effect.
Said another way, mock jurors were not being harsh on Bedder because they construed multiple stabbings as a sign of malice or premeditation, for changing the fact pattern that might give rise to that
construction did not change verdicts.
The analysis of the specific variables of impotence (impotence vs. no
impotence) and provocation (laugh vs. slap), and their interaction effect, reveals a significant finding only for provocation. When the victim only laughs and taunts, 80% register a SM verdict, but when the
provocation gets physical, with a slap, the verdicts divide nearly
equally between SM (51%) and VM (49%). Again, as in experiment I,
the old legal dividing line between words and deeds, taunts and assaults, seems to be endorsed by ordinary citizens.
The impotence factor did not reduce SM verdicts; if anything, there
is a greater percentage of SM verdicts (70% vs. 60%) when Bedder is
impotent than when not, though this difference fails to reach significance. It may further suggest what was advanced from the first experiment: that the notion of contributory negligence may be operating,
for Bedder knows he is impotent, yet puts himself in a high risk situation. The interaction effect, though not significant, lends further support, albeit tentative: for in the impotent/slap condition, 59% find this
Bedder guilty of SM, but in the nonimpotent/slap condition only 43%
find him guilty of SM. Why the difference?
The nonimpotent man, suddenly slapped, may react in the "heat of
passion." But if "heat" (i.e., the intensity of the emotion) was the criti-

794

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:742

cal variable, we would expect that the impotent man's emotions are
likely to be even hotter than his nonimpotent counterpart, and that
the impotent man would get more mitigating mileage; yet he gets less.
Thus the determinative factor cannot be a "hotness difference." The
answer to why jurors react more coldly (i.e., fewer VM verdicts) to the
"higher heat" (i.e., impotence) condition may involve thoughts and
choices, more than emotions. When the impotent man who has chosen
to put himself at risk feels the slap, this may well arouse anger, but it
may also awaken his ill-considerd choice: angers may roil, but the toil
may come from choosing unwisely. Had Athena let Achilles decide on
his two choices, and let him act on his choice, neither the Muse nor the
Bard might sing his tale, had he chosen murder. This sort of choice, I
suggest, may be what mock jurors find more culpable.
Turning to the Cooper case, there is a large significant difference
among the four conditions (XI [3, N=110] = 27.9, p<.0001). For the
brooder condition, only 26% gave a VM verdict; for the rekindler and
frequent rekindler conditions, the VM percentages jump to 57% and
61% respectively; and for the heat of passion condition, where the killing occurs immediately after the sodomy, 96% register a VM verdict.
The pre-planned comparisons reveal that there is a significant difference between the immediate condition and all three conditions where
a killing occurred three weeks later; a significant effect between the
brooder and the rekindling conditions; and no significant effect between the rekindling and frequent rekindling conditions.
In experiment I, where we had eight conditions and tested many
variables, we found, overall, that time did not matter. In this experiment, where half the conditions were pared away, time matters. The
basic heat of passion condition produces almost 100% VM verdicts, but
when time intrudes between sodomy and death, where temperature
may drop or malice may grow in the interval, VM verdicts drop to approximately 60% in the rekindling conditions. While there is clearly a
drop, it must be noted, still, that two-thirds of the verdicts are manslaughter verdicts. But when there is no external, visible, objective
provocation, as in the brooder condition, the VM drop is great, such
that now three-quarters of the mock jurors are giving SM verdicts.
Here we see time interacting with provocation. In the heat of passion condition (when time is zero), the provocation is the sodomy. In
the rekindler and frequent rekindler cases (when time is three weeks),
the provocation is not just the taunt: for if it was just the taunt, we
should see VM verdicts as low as Bedder's under the taunt condition;
but we do not, as VM verdicts for Cooper under rekindling are much
higher. Thus mock jurors must be incorporating the sodomy along
with the taunts as the provocation. In the brooder condition, there is
no taunt, just the past sodomy, plus whatever Cooper is brooding
about in his mind. The sodomy, however, must play some part in the
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provocation picture for mock jurors, otherwise the SM verdicts would
approach 100%; as 26% give a VM verdict, this verdict must be based
on something, and that something is the sodomy, in all likelihood. But
with the rekindling taunt absent-an objective act that not only rekindles but reconnects the nexus between present and past-the
brooder is at a disadvantage, and he pays for it with more SM verdicts.
The mock jurors' reasons for their verdict decisions were again analyzed, using stepwise regression, canonical discriminant analysis,
and cluster analysis procedures, and the results were quite consistent
with the first experiment. To briefly summarize, mock jurors who give
VM or SM verdicts construe the case through some similar and some
dissimlar constructs, and canonical analysis shows which factors predict to which verdict, with these results being quite consistent with
those of the first experiment. As to clusters, there is again the cluster
that deals with the factors of mens rea (malice) and emotion/passion,
coupled with an objective or subjective reasonable person interpreting
both factors; there is another cluster that deals with context, and how
this affects threat and possible control; and there is a third cluster
where the correlated variables of provocation and time interact.
C. Simple Heuristics vs. Complex Calculus
One after another, across a 300 year period, the objective rules for
manslaughter erupted. As the treatise writers told the tale, one might
think these rules, like puzzle parts precisely fitting, created one unified theory, a seemless web of coherence. But beneath this fiction,
legal evolution was marked by upheaval, clashes, and contradictions-where individual rules and individual exceptions collided.
With conundrums muted, the objective law presented a set of rules,
which, when properly applied to case facts, would yield consistent verdicts comporting with our notions of culpability. That was the hope
and the prediction, and both were dashed.
Subjective dangers lurked around the rules like Scylla and Charybdis, and ran many common law cases aground in twisted endings.
Without a wily pilot like Odysseus, the objective ordinary man exemplar would be called to the scene to set the matter right. This ordinary
man would eschew subjective waters for more solid dry land. In doing
so, the exemplar eliminated untidy variability, including the
defendant.
A "rule" is a simple heuristic, when we pare it to its essence.
Whether the rule is about a taunt or a slap, seeing an adulterous act
or hearing it, or acting on the spot or waiting a day or two-the rule
tells us how to decide, in almost simplistic yes/no terms. However,
when we look at how ordinary citizens decide such cases, we see no
simple heuristics-but a complex calculus-grounded in psychology,
subjectivity' and narrative. In this storied world, variables interact in
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messy ways, and even at the level of a single variable, it is neither
simple nor entirely objective. "Provocations" do not label themselves
as "manslaughter worthy" or not; we do. And whether a provocation is
judged worthy depends on whether it is viewed idiographically or generally, subjectively or objectively, and on how such variables as context, time, threat, emotion, thinking, and control are construed.
In this complex story, ordinary citizens see the past as alive in the
present, under certain conditions. When they see past provocations as
alive today, they understand that this past context colors what the
defendant sees and feels and thinks in the present moment. This psychological view makes "objective time" less relevant. A man
sodomized in the past and taunted in the present, fearing future
taunts and, perhaps, even another attack-lives in the present psychological moment where past, present, and future are one. When discrete designations of time (past, present, and future) collapse, context
expands, becoming more rich and relevant to commonsense justice.
The commonsense construal of context also reveals some commonsense boundaries on time: while a sodomy that is three weeks or six
months old is deemed relevant, distant acts of abuse in childhood are
deemed irrelevant. This finding tells us two things: first, commonsense justice defines a different boundary than the law; and second, it
is not an open-ended, anything goes, indiscriminate matter, for commonsense justice does set boundaries.
Commonsense justice creates an idiographic story, more so than
the law. And idiographic stories pull the viewer into the psychological
and subjective, more so, certainly, than general, objective tales, where
defendants are fungible, or replaceable by an exemplar. Yet objectivity is not abandoned: provocations and taunts need objective grounding, for when the stimulus is only in the brooder's head, and not in the
objective environment as it is for the rekindler, the brooder fares
poorly.
The objective law and commonsense justice turn out to be far apart
in major ways. The three hundred year reign of objectivity was at end,
as the law would take a dramatic turn, seemingly in the direction of
commonsense justice. The new law, marked by the Model Penal Code,
would bring subjectivity back into the law. But in swinging the other
way, the question remains: Had the law gone too far into the
subjective?
VII. THE MPC: SUBJECTIVITY ADRIFT
The MPC represents a radical and subjective veer. More by coincidence than mindfulness, the MPC shifts toward the direction academic psychology was taking; and more by mindfulness than
coincidence, the MPC shifts toward the direction commonsense psychology had been taking all along. In an intuitive, subjective, and
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penumbral way, the MPC recognizes that the actor who commits manslaughter and the actor who commits murder are not on the same footing. At this point, though, the MPC drafters' faith and footing rests
infirmly on a subjective feeling. For when objective rules, doctrinal
rationales, and stare decisis no longer provide grounding, and when
hard evidence and empirics neither inform nor channel-mark the
course, it will be the MPC's version of subjectivity itself-disconnected
and adrift-which must steer alone.
Through codes, laws, and rules we try to define and differentiate a
subject matter clearly. Like the intent of a realist or impressionist
painter, one test for the Code is whether it brings subtle details or
illuminating light to the shadowy penumbra of manslaughter law.
The Code's subjective definition of manslaughter is:
a homicide which would otherwise be murder [is manslaughter when it] is
committed under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for
which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse. The reasonableness of
such explanation or excuse shall be determined from the viewpoint of a person
in the actor's situation under the circumstances as he believes them to be.163

This definition unmistakably tilts to the subjective-both in the viewpoint it takes, and the new language of "extreme mental or emotional
disturbance." Yet, there may be a hint of equivocation in the terms
"reasonable explanation" and "reasonableness": though "reasonable
explanation" sounds like something the objective, ordinary man might
expect, "reasonableness" then becomes subjective in the next sentence.
In other parts of the Code, though, a "quasi-subjective"164 approach,
where an objective remnant still clings and attaches to a subjective
cloth, is evident. For example, with the doctrines of self-defense and
duress, and in the area of justification, the objective remnants of "necessary," "proportionate," and "balancing of the harm prevented
against the harm caused" are tied to the essentially subjective
definition.
But when "provocation" alone fills the frame, there is nothing
"quasi," queasy, or objective in the picture. Crowning its subjectivity,
the Code "sweeps away the rigid rules that limited provocation to cer-

tain defined circumstances .

.

. [and submits] that question to the

jury."165 "The Code thus jettisoned all of the objective language and
tests of the past 150 years-'adequate provocation,' 'cooling off,' 'reasonable man. .. .'166
Though the MPC drafters placed the crown on subjectivity, jurisdictions, like rebellious dukes, were not in agreement when it came to
the Code's adoption. As Singer states, "the history of adoption of the
163. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(l)(b) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
164. Norman J. Finkel & Christopher Slobogin, Insanity, Justification,and Culpability: Toward a Unifying Schema, 19 L. & Hum. BEHAV. 447 (1995).
165. MODEL PENAL CODE, § 210.3(1)(b) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
166. Singer, supra note 15, at 292.
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Model Penal Code's EED [extreme mental or emotional disturbance]
language is mixed. Although it has won favor in some jurisdictions, it
has been directly rejected by others, and severely modified in still
others."167
More than mere adoption was the problem of interpreting and applying the EED standard. To illustrate, two Connecticut cases, State
v. Zdanis168 and State v. Elliot169 both dealt with "brooders" who

killed victims without a provocative act by the victim; nothing external or objective for the ordinary man or juror to cite as the explicable
reason or provocation. The appellate court in Zdanis made it clear
that "virtually any reaction to any stimulus may be considered in an
EED jurisdiction,"1 70 and the appellate court in Elliot went even
further:
[Tihe defense [of EED] does not require a provoking or triggering event; or
that the homicidal act occur immediately after the cause or causes of the defendant's extreme emotional disturbance.... A homicide influenced by an
extreme emotional disturbance is not one which is necessarily committed in
the "hot blood" stage, but rather one that was brought about by a significant
mental trauma that caused the defendant to brood for a17long
period of time
1
and then react violently, seemingly without provocation.

The appellate courts' dicta is good news for the brooder. He gets a
much sweeter deal under this EED construal than under the objective
law. And he gets a more lenient verdict under EED than the mock
jurors give him. For both mock jurors and the objective law insist on
some minimal, objective, external connection between a taunt and a
killing for a manslaughter verdict, whereas EED severs the nexus between provocation and the EED that leads to a killing. But what is
good news for the brooder turns out to be bad news for the law. For
the new song seems to be, "anything goes."
Looked at psychologically, this EED construal is naive, faulty, and
just plain bad subjectivity. It is a return to the old, rejected psychology where structures and mental entities float about in the mind, with
each entity having a will and mind of its own. In this sort of subjective
law, as in this sort of mind, there exists a disembodied and disconnected EED, severed from its nexus to provocation on the front end,
untied to control and action on the back end, yet producing mayhem,
murder, and manslaughter in its wake. And if we are prepared to
grant this EED alien such autonomy, it will surely claim mitigation as
its due.
The contrast with academic psychology's The Discursive Mind
could not be greater. The subjectivity that Professors Rom Harre and
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id. at 294.
438 A.2d 696 (Conn. 1980).
411 A.2d 3 (Conn. 1979).
Singer, supra note 15, at 295 (regarding State v. Zdanis).
Id.; State v. Elliot, 411 A.2d 3, 8 (Conn. 1979).

1995]

MURDER/MANSLAUGHTER DISTINCTION

Grant Gillett espouse is dynamic, "embedded in historical, political,
cultural, social and interpersonal contexts. It is not definable in isolation."172 In sharp contrast is the law's subjectivity, where EED stands

in isolation, a mental entity not interrelated to, or embedded in, any
context, save subjectivity itself. Like some alien entity in a sci-fi
movie, EED erupts without cause-decontextually-and what is
worse-it erupts without good reason.
Yet the law needs reasons to mitigate, as do mock jurors. Mock
jurors find a reason in the objective taunts for the rekinder, but not
for the brooder. But as EED severs the contextual nexus, it provides
no mitigating reason in context. Instead, EED turns inward-to attributions, speculations, and rationalizations of a specious and subjective sort-offering a "psychology" that varies from primitive to "pop."
Thus the law's psychology is indeed different from what academic psychology is proposing. The EED standard is no standard at all, for it is
without definition or grounding. In resting on bad psychology, in
clearing away all remnants of objectivity, and in proffering an "anything goes" standard, the law bungee jumps into subjectivity, without
a cord, plunging further than academic psychology or commonsense
justice finds prudent. The outcome is likely to be a crash landing, a
Rorschach-like splattering, and bad law.
There is other evidence that EED is going down the wrong road.
As Singer notes through a variety of case law decisions, EED has been
linked with "imperfect self-defense," insanity, and diminished capacity and diminished responsibility notions; EED has been unlinked to
responsibility, moral blameworthiness, proportional punishment; and
EED has promoted "the mounting use of psychiatric testimony in
these cases."'7s Why this is the wrong road can be illustrated through
insanity law.
"Insanity" law is instructive here, for rules and law, on the one
hand, and mental entities and subjectivity, on the other, come together. From the "wild beast" test of 1723 to the Insanity Defense
Reform Act of 1984, insanity law has travelled inward, trying to parse
the defendant's psyche into appropriate and offending entities-responsible or nonresponsible cognitions, and/or resistible or irresistible
impulses-to find the guiding, discriminative rule. Each new rule was
touted in its time as the answer. But setting this maddening matter
of insanity right, like slaying the Hydra without Hercules, proved difficult, and it was the rules, rather than the beast that bit the dust.
But in this process, new rules continued to spring full blown from erroneous assumptions; "ordinary common sense" turned out to be bizarre if not floridly delusional; and simplistic heuristics and outright
172. HARRE & GILrr, supra note 108, at 25.
173. Singer, supra note 15, at 298.
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myths reigned, as Professor Michael Perlinl'74 has persuasively argued. And what the rules have not arisen from, is empirical evidence:
for when such tests are put to the empirical test, they fail to produce
discriminatively different verdicts, and they fail to square with the ju75
rors" commonsense constructs. 1
The MPC drafters, mindful that the objective rules for manslaughter had failed, turned, correctly, it would seem, toward the subjective.
This turn held the promise of greater alignment with commonsense
justice, and held out greater hope for doctrinal consistency. But while
the direction was appropriate, the chosen path was not. This new,
exclusively subjective path-a solipsistic slide into extreme emotional
disturbance-was already antiquated; it deadended in a dark mind of
hallucinatory projections and psychological entities, but which emitted no light and, finally, no lasting rules.
VIII. CONCLUSION OF THE STORY
As Singer reflects, common sense just seems to understand "that
persons in extreme situations normally do not 'intend' very much of
anything; they merely wish to end the stressful situation."1 76 If the
actor did not intend anything, but struck out in blind distress, we
know that this is different from murder. Even if the actor did intend
to strike under provocation, our common sense tells us that the actor
likely did not contemplate the consequences of his act in the way the
murderer does. Manslaughter is different from murder; the law
knows this, and commonsense justice knows this. But on what is our
knowledge grounded?
If it is airy notions-like "it just feels right"-or legal lexical litanies-like "extreme emotional disturbance"-our prayers for understanding will not be answered. Watery metaphors of emotional
currents beneath the surface do no better for either subjectivity or the
174. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, Psychodynamics and the Insanity Defense: "Ordinary
Common Sense" and Heuristic Reasoning, 69 NaB. L. REv. 3 (1990); ichael L.
Perlin, Unpacking the Myths: The Symbolism Mythology of Insanity Defense Jurisprudence,40 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 599 (1990); ichael L. Perlin, The Supreme
Court, the Mentally Disabled Criminal Defendant, and Symbolic Values: Random Decisions, Hidden Rationales, or "DoctrinalAbyss?", 29 ARz. L. REv. 1
(1987).
175. See, e.g., NoRmAN J. FnMEL, INSAMTY ON TuL (1988); Norman J. Finkel &
Sharon F. Handel, How Jurors Construe "Insanity," 13 L. & HuM. BFECAV. 41
(1989); Norman J. Finkel & Solomon M. Fulero, Insanity: Making Law in the
Absence of Evidence, 11 INT'L J. OF MED. & L. 383 (1992); Norman J. Finkel, The
Insanity Defense: A Comparisonof Verdict Schemas, 15 L. & HuM. BEHAV. 533;
Norman J. Finkel, The Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984: Much Ado About
Nothing, 7 BEHAVIORAL Sci. & L. 403 (1989).
176. Singer, supra note 15, at 310.
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law, for their Sirens' songs leave us adrift or plunge us into an endless
night sea journey.
Subjectivity and stories, however, are promising turns. But not
any subjectivity will do. The subjectivity must have substance, and,
as the mock jurors' verdicts reveal, must have some anchor in consensual reality. The brooder vs. rekindler difference turns on the fact
that the brooder's subjectivity remains untied to any provocation in
reality, whereas the rekindler's is clearly tied to an objective taunt.
And not any story will do. A story must be coherent and plausible. In
this regard, the stories of academic psychology and commonsense justice are way ahead of those used by the framers of the law.
At the conclusion of their book The Discursive Mind, Professors
Harre and Gillett state: "We need to see mental life as a dynamic activity, engaged in by people, who are located in a range of interacting
discourses and at certain positions in those discourses and who, from
the possibilities they make available, attempt to fashion relatively integrated and coherent subjectivities for themselves."177
At the conclusion of his paper, Professor Richard Singer turns to
"common sensical 'rough justice,'" and offers an approach that he admits "may seem simplistic."78 He states: "But after four centuries of
recognizing that some distinction must be made among killers, while
struggling with a verbal formula to capture that distinction, it may,
perhaps, be true that here, as in many other areas, less really is
more."179
I believe Singer has it right, but only in part. The common sensical
"rough justice" he recommends in the end-where jurors use their
subjective sentiments to decide the murder vs. manslaughter question-seems to be offered out of four centuries of weariness: it becomes "the default" option, because the objective rules option that the
law so long invested in, went broke. Singer is right that jurors' subjectivity and rough justice will produce better justice than objective rules
and ethereal exemplars. The empirical evidencelsO that was
presented confirms that: mock jurors' verdicts and reasons reveal
more sophisticated distinctions, and tell a more coherent story, than
that produced by the objective rules or the sort of disconnected subjectivity as espoused in the MPC.
But where Singer's recommendation emerges after he surveys four
centuries of failure, Harre and Gillett's recommendation emerges from
empirical and conceptual investigations into subjectivity itself. Such
scrutiny brings subjectivity into the light, revealing narrative, discourse, and stories, and a rich contextual web of interconnections.
177. HARRE & GLmn r, supra note 108, at 180.
178. Singer, supra note 15, at 322.

179. Id.
180. See supra Parts V and VI (detailing empirical results).
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This "subjectivity" is far more interesting, enlightening, and connected than what the MPC put forth.
My own conclusions, I believe, come from even more firm and fertile ground. They are empirically derived from specific cases and fact
patterns, where nuances were manipulated and tested, and where
commonsense justice could speak through verdicts and the reasons for
the verdicts to the murder vs. manslaughter distinction. And this
voice tells a sophisticated idiographic and subjective story. In the
main, it is a story rich in history, context, subtext, and interconnections, yet a story with objectivity as well. For facts and external provocations play a key role: this is why brooders fair more poorly in the
court of commonsense justice than they do in Connecticut courts
under EED and MPC, when judged by appellate judges. What the
judges and the current MPC/EED standard lack, the mock jurors apparently have: a complex calculus that fashions coherent psychological stories. These stories neither crash into objective rules that litter
the road, nor fly off into deep space, nor plunge into fathomless
subjectivity.
The "manslaughter story" that emerges is not one story, but many,
for many defendants get that verdict even though provocations (their
type and degree), emotions (their type and degree), cooling time, context, and history all differ. This is not "ruleless," but merely complex.
We see in this complexity, for example, that manslaughter is not just
"a crime of passion," as it has been advertised for so long, but a partial
failure of reason. Reason may falter before the front end action even
begins, because the actor makes a bad choice to put himself and others
at risk. Reason may falter on the front end, in the way provocations
are perceived and construed, or it may falter on the back end, where
reason's flimsiness may justify the anger and the act, rather than controlling its occurrence.
Mitigation appears appropriate when these complex conditions are
satisfied, for it reflects the culpability gradations people discern. This
is more than good policy; it is good principle-the principle of
proportionality.
The law has tried to reify those abstract gradations with objective
rules-rules that have failed. By abandoning objective rules, the
law's new subjectivity (its EED standard) created an old monster-a
disembodied and disconnected psychic entity, without form or coherence, sweeping through courtrooms with expert witnesses sniffing for
the scent. The law can do better.
The concluding remarks return to "stories," and the stories of
Achilles fuming, Odysseus stewing, and Hamlet brooding, as their verdicts in a modern court were in doubt, and put on hold. If Law is logic,
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which it is not,181 a syllogistic conclusion would follow; ifjudges were
as Holmesian as Sherlock, rather than Oliver Wendell, an elementary
and dispositive solution would end the story; but nothing that passes
for the "truth" will be offered. Neither stories nor cases end that way.
Literary exemplars, like legal exemplars, should serve rather than
rule. This story serves to remind us, lest we forget, that the murder
vs. manslaughter story-be it murder "most foul, strange, and unnatural,"182 or a slaughter where wrathful swords, avenging arrows,
poison-tipped rapiers, and red-hot passions combine-is not formulaic. It is an idiographic story about a real person, with a unique
history and psychological makeup, who is not fungible with another
person or prototype. Try switching Achilles and Hamlet into the
other's story, and I suggest that the brooding Hamlet never leaves the
tent, and, with wrathful Achilles as Hamlet, Hamlet ends in Act I.
There is no story to sing of here.
Yet the story of the story is a story, I submit. In this story I tell
various points of view-literary, legal, psychological, and common
sensical-brought together, with lines, arguments, and empirics converging. Because it is a story rather than a proof, divergence is still
possible; others might take the same data and construct other stories.
Some might argue that the MPC trusts in the good judgment ofjurors,
and the results from my mock jurors reinforces the MPC's faith that
less law may yield more law. That, though, is a different story than
the one I tell, and the mock jurors tell. That mock jurors "get it right"
despite lack of guidance from the MPC-is credit to the jurors, not the
MPC; that jurors invoke certain rules within a ruleless EED redounds
not to the EED, but to the jurors. When we fathom the story that
mock jurors tell, it is a story that has more substance to its subjectivity than MPC and EED. It is a substance that is grounded in empirics, common sense, and a rich psychological context. It yields the
better story, I submit. And if the law would more faithfully track that
story, it would yield better law.

181. RONALD DwoRmN, LAW'S EMPn (1986).
182. SHAKESPEARE, supra note 18, act 1, sc. 5.

